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INTRODUCTION
“I [was] . . . the equal of the gods, save only [t]hat I must die.”
–Euripides 1

Federal administrative law judges (“ALJs”) understand
Euripides’s irony all too well. 2 They, along with Article I judges, are

+

Reprinted with permission of the Vanderbilt Law Review, at 66 VAND.
L. REV. 797 (2013).
*Assistant Professor, University of Georgia School of Law. I appreciate
the helpful comments from Ian Ayres, Rachel Barkow, Dan Coenen, Jacob Gersen,
Tara Leigh Grove, Matt Hall, Michael Healy, Jeffrey Lubbers, Tuan Samahon,
Michael Sant’Ambrogio, David Shipley, Mark Tushnet, Chris Walker, Adam
Zimmerman, and participants at the 2012 Yale-Stanford-Harvard Junior Faculty
Forum, the 2012 Junior Faculty Federal Courts Forum, and the University of
Georgia and the University of Kentucky law-faculty workshops. I also appreciate
the gracious assistance of the editorial staff at the VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW. An
earlier draft of this Article was cited in JOHN M. ROGERS, MICHAEL P. HEALY &
RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 460 (3d ed. 2012).
1

EURIPIDES, HECUBA 33 (tran. line 341–44) (John Harrison ed. & trans.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2008) (quoting Princess Polyxena’s speech, delivered
before she is sacrificed).
2
ALJs have successfully lobbied for more prestigious titles, evolving
from mere “examiners,” to “hearing examiners,” to “administrative law judges.”
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on Our Invisible
Judiciary, 33 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 110 n.8 (1981); see also K.G. Jan Pillai,
Rethinking Judicial Immunity for the Twenty-First Century, 39 HOW. L.J. 95, 123
(1995):
Naturally, the ALJs would like to think of themselves as judges
or the functional equivalent of federal judges. In 1972, they
persuaded the Civil Service Commission (now the OPM) to
change their title from ‘hearing examiner’ to ‘administrative law
judge’ for the purpose of enhancing their public image and
prestige.
Yet, they are commonly referred to as ALJs, a designation that arguably diminishes
their judicial status. They are not amused. See Lubbers, supra, at 109 n.1 (citing the
August 1979 Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference newsletter); see also
James P. Timony, Disciplinary Proceedings Against Federal Administrative Law
Judges, 6 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 807, 814–15 (1984) (relaying how Third Circuit
Judge Aldisert “noted” and dismissed “the past prejudice of some Article III federal
judges, scholarly critics and attorneys who believe[d] that administrative law
judges were second-class judges (if judges at all)” (citing NLRB v. Permanent
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the demigods of federal adjudication. As both courts and ALJs have
noted, the function of ALJs closely parallels that of Article III
judges. 3 ALJs hear evidence, decide factual issues, and apply legal
principles in all formal administrative adjudications under the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 4 Indeed, they outnumber
Article III judges 5 and decide more than two hundred and fifty
thousand cases each year. 6 But they lack the defining characteristics
of Article III deities. Article III judges are installed under the
Appointments Clause, 7 enjoy tenure and salary protection during
times of “good Behavior,” 8 and are not generally subject to reversal
Label Corp., 657 F.2d 512, 527–28 (3d Cir. 1981) (Aldisert, J., concurring))). Like
Professor Lubbers, I use the ubiquitous acronym only for brevity.
3
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978):
[P]roceedings [before an ALJ] are adversary in nature. . . . They
are conducted before a trier of fact insulated from political
influence. . . . A party is entitled to present his case by oral or
documentary evidence . . . and the transcript of testimony and
exhibits together with the pleadings constitute the exclusive
record for decision.
(citations omitted); Robin J. Artz et al., Advancing the Judicial Independence and
Efficiency of the Administrative Judiciary: A Report to the President-Elect of the
United States, 29 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 93, 95 (2009) (“ALJs are
the functional equivalent of federal trial judges.”).
4
5 U.S.C. §§ 553–54, 556–57 (2006) (detailing requirements for formal
administrative rulemaking and adjudication). Although ALJs can also preside in
formal rulemaking proceedings, id. §§ 553(c), 556–57, formal rulemaking is
extremely rare, see Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure
Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 95, 107 (2003) (“Because the
impracticalities of formal rulemaking are well known, Congress rarely requires this
technique, and courts avoid interpreting statutes to require it, even in the rare cases
where the statute seems to do so.”). This Article concerns only ALJs’ duties in
formal adjudications.
5
Compare
Judges
and
Judgeships,
U.S.
COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/
JudgesAndJudgeships/FederalJudgeships.aspx
(last
visited Jan. 14, 2013) (listing 874 total Article III judgeships), with Free Enter.
Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3180–81 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
Federal Government relies on 1,584 ALJs to adjudicate administrative matters in
over 25 agencies.”).
6
See Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections upon the Federal Administrative
Judiciary, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1346 n.18 (1992) (stating that ALJs decided
more than two hundred and fifty thousand social security cases in 1990).
7
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
8
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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by the executive branch. 9 In contrast, ALJs are hired as mere
employees by executive officials, receive more limited salary
protection than Article III judges, and are subject to removal within
the executive branch. 10 Moreover, the agencies for which ALJs
work—often themselves parties to the proceedings—can reverse
ALJs’ decisions in toto.11 In Euripidean parlance, ALJs are equal to
Article III judges, except for the Article III part.
The Structural Quandary
These differences between ALJs and Article III judges do
more than chisel a chip on ALJs’ shoulders. They reveal material
practical and constitutional tensions, if not constitutional violations,
that the U.S. Supreme Court has recently revitalized. These tensions
concern ALJs’ appointments, the President’s supervisory powers
over ALJs, and ALJs’ independence and impartiality. These three
concerns are in tension, rendering their resolution difficult.
First. If, as five current Supreme Court Justices have now
suggested, 12 ALJs are “inferior Officers” (not mere employees), the
manner in which some are currently selected is likely
unconstitutional. 13 The Appointments Clause in Article II of the U.S.
Constitution requires that such officers be appointed in one of four
ways: by (1) the President with the Senate’s consent, (2) the
President alone, (3) the courts of law, or (4) heads of departments. 14
9

Federal agencies can reverse judicial statutory interpretations under
certain circumstances. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 983–84 (2005) (permitting agencies to provide authoritative
interpretations of ambiguous statutory language even after a contrary judicial
interpretation).
10.
See generally infra Part I.
11
See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006) (“On appeal from or review of the [ALJ’s]
initial decision, the agency has all the powers which it would have in making the
initial decision except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule.”).
12
See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3180–81 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, Ginsburg & Sotomayor, JJ.) (asking
whether the majority’s holding that dual for-cause insulation is unconstitutional
would affect ALJs, who might be considered “Officers”); Freytag v. Comm’r, 501
U.S. 868, 910 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
joined by O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (“[ALJs] are all executive officers.”
(emphasis omitted)).
13
See infra Part II.A.
14.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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ALJs, however, are selected by heads of agencies, only some of
whom qualify as heads of departments.
Second. ALJs’ job (or tenure) protections may improperly
limit the President’s implied power to remove and supervise
executive-branch officers under Article II of the U.S. Constitution. 15
The agencies that select ALJs can remove them only for “good
cause” and only with the consent of an independent federal agency,
the Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”), whose members the
President can remove only for enumerated reasons. A recent U.S.
Supreme Court decision, Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB,
invalidated the use of “tiered” tenure protection (i.e., two layers of
tenure protection between the President and the officer at issue) for
inferior officers. 16 The four dissenting Justices in that decision noted
that ALJs’ two tiers of tenure protection (one for ALJs and one for
the MSPB) would also appear to limit the President’s supervisory
power improperly. 17 In short, the Court’s most recent foray into this
area suggests that the removal regime for ALJs clashes with the
President’s executive authority. 18
Third. At the same time, increasing presidential control over
ALJs would create impartiality concerns under the Due Process
Clause. Agencies are parties to proceedings before the same ALJs
that they appoint and that they may remove for good cause (albeit
subject to the MSPB’s consent). 19 If ALJs lose one of their two tiers
of tenure protection, either (1) agencies will be able to remove ALJs
at will (and thus render the MSPB’s extant tenure protection and role
meaningless) or (2) agencies will be able to remove ALJs for cause
with the consent of the MSPB, whose members the President can
remove at will. The Supreme Court has strongly indicated that,
despite some contrary scholarly opinions, the current ALJ model is
sufficient under the Due Process Clause. But its recent decision
concerning recusal of elected state-court judges, Caperton v. A.T.
15.

See infra Part II.B.
See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164 (majority opinion) (“[T]he Act
before us imposes a new type of restriction—two levels of protection from removal
for those who nonetheless exercise significant executive power. Congress cannot
limit the President’s authority in this way.”).
17
See id. at 3181 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Does every losing party before
an ALJ now have grounds to appeal on the basis that the decision entered against
him is unconstitutional?”).
18
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
19
See infra Part II.C.
16
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Massey Coal Co., 20 casts doubt on this view. The agencies’ ability to
appoint ALJs and initiate their removal creates obvious incentives for
ALJs to favor agency positions. Regardless of whether this partiality
problem assumes an unconstitutional dimension, the current structure
raises problems for ALJs, agencies, parties that appear before ALJs,
and society as a whole.
Existing proposals to reform the ALJ system fail to identify,
much less solve, these competing concerns. 21 For instance, simply
permitting a department head (perhaps of a new independent agency)
to appoint ALJs would resolve the appointment issue, but not fully
address due process or presidential-supervision concerns. Likewise,
providing ALJs increased tenure protection may resolve lingering
independence concerns, but leave the President with insufficient
supervisory power over ALJs, while not addressing the appointment
issue at all. Conversely, reducing ALJ tenure protection may resolve
presidential-supervision concerns, but damage ALJ independence
and, once again, fail to address Appointments Clause concerns.
The Solution
My proposed remedy is to permit the D.C. Circuit to appoint,
discipline, and remove ALJs upon request from administrative
agencies. 22 Permitting a “Court[] of Law” to appoint ALJs, who are
at most “inferior Officers” within the executive branch, comports
with the text of the Appointments Clause and Supreme Court case
law. 23 To be sure, the Court has prohibited Congress from creating
“incongruous” interbranch appointments. 24 Although the Court’s
20

556 U.S. 868 (2009).
See infra Part III.
22
See infra Part IV.A.
23
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[T]he Congress may by law vest the
Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper . . . in the Courts of
Law . . . .”).
24
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 675 (1988):
21

We do not mean to say that Congress’ power to provide for
interbranch appointments of ‘inferior officers’ is unlimited. In
addition to separation of powers concerns . . . Congress’ decision
to vest the appointment power in the courts would be improper if
there was some ‘incongruity’ between the functions normally
performed by the courts and the performance of their duty to
appoint.
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existing approach to incongruity is murky, I extract from it a threepart inquiry that unifies the incongruity principle with the separationof-powers constraints that the Court has erected in this field. In short,
courts should deem an interbranch appointment appropriate when
(1) Congress has a significant justification for turning to its
interbranch-appointment power, (2) the power to appoint (and an
incidental power to remove) does not impede the appointing branch’s
central functioning under the U.S. Constitution, and (3) the lack of
appointment (and removal) power does not, likewise, impede the
competing branch’s central functioning.
The D.C. Circuit’s appointment of ALJs satisfies these three
criteria. First, it is significantly justified because it resolves the three
constitutional concerns. It does so by properly placing the
appointment power in a “court of law”; ending “tiered” removal
protection within the executive branch for ALJs by appropriately
giving the D.C. Circuit the power to remove ALJs, as consistent with
existing interbranch-appointment doctrine and even the underlying
rationale of Free Enterprise Fund; and limiting the executive
branch’s role in appointing and removing the adjudicators for formal
proceedings to which executive agencies are often parties. Second,
the interbranch appointment does not impede the central functioning
of the D.C. Circuit. As the court that hears numerous administrative
law cases and has the lowest judge-to-merits-decisions ratio among
the circuit courts, the D.C. Circuit has the expertise and time to
appoint and remove other adjudicators. Indeed, Article III courts
currently perform the interbranch appointment and removal of Article
I bankruptcy judges, as well as the intrabranch appointment and
removal of magistrate judges and special masters. Third, the
interbranch appointment does not impede the central functioning of
the executive branch. The executive branch may still formulate all
administrative policy that arises from formal adjudication by
continuing to reverse ALJ decisions in toto under the APA.
Ultimately, this Article seeks to do three things. It seeks to
identify the three competing concerns surrounding ALJs, suggest a
workable statutory solution to a major problem in administrative law
that recent Supreme Court decisions have brought into focus, and
clarify the nature and benefits of Congress’s interbranch-appointment
power for the federal administrative state. To those ends, Part I
provides a brief synopsis of current ALJ hiring, removal, and
independence protections. Part II considers the constitutional
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questions surrounding ALJs’ selection, removal, and independence to
bring the tripartite quandary into clear view. Part III considers the
limitations on prior solutions and scholarship in light of the
quandary, most of which focus only on ALJ independence. And
finally, Part IV provides a refined manner of analyzing the propriety
of interbranch appointments and argues that an interbranch
appointment of ALJs resolves the quandary. Even with a permissible
interbranch appointment, ALJs certainly won’t be gods. But a limited
ALJ apotheosis, brought about by an interbranch appointment, should
mitigate concerns that surround ALJs’ place within our government
of separated powers.
I. ALJS’ CURRENT SELECTION, REMOVAL, AND PROTECTIONS
A brief exposition of the current manner of ALJ selection,
removal, and independence permits a better understanding of the
theoretical and doctrinal concerns mentioned above. An interbranchappointment remedy, as explained later, can adopt much of the
current ALJ appointment and removal structure by reallocating
various powers to effect the desired structural improvement.
A. Current ALJ Selection
The appointment of ALJs, unlike that of Article III judges,
does not require the President’s nomination and the Senate’s
confirmation. 25 Instead, each federal agency selects ALJs “as are
necessary” for the agency to conduct formal adjudicatory
proceedings. 26 The President is not directly, if at all, involved in the
selection of ALJs, and the Senate does not serve as a check on the
agency’s choice.
But agencies do not have carte blanche when selecting ALJs.
Instead, the Office of Personnel Management (“OPM”) creates and
administers standards for ALJ selection for the approximately sixteen
hundred federal ALJs. 27 Candidates must be licensed attorneys with

25

See Harold Levinson, The Status of the Administrative Judge, 38 AM. J.
COMP. L. (SUPP.) 523, 532–33 (1990) (contrasting the Article III appointment
process with ALJ selection).
26
5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2006).
27
See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3180–81 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“My research reflects that the Federal Government relies
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at least seven years’ experience and pass an examination that tests
their ability to draft a decision and analyze relevant legal issues. 28
Military veterans receive five to ten preference points.29 Based on
their experiences, examination scores, and veteran statuses, the
highest-scoring candidates are placed on a list. 30 Agencies, under
what is known as the “Rule of Three,” 31 may then select from the
three highest-ranking candidates. 32
Agencies, perhaps unsurprisingly, have sought to avoid the
Rule of Three. They have instead sought “selective certification.” 33
on 1,584 ALJs to adjudicate administrative matters in over 25 agencies.”);
Levinson, supra note 25, at 533.
28
VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34607,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2010); Jesse Etelson, The New
ALJ Examination: A Bright, Shining Lie Redux, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 185, 191–93
(1991) (explaining and critiquing the ALJ written examination that requires
candidates to draft a hypothetical opinion).
29
Veterans’ Preference Act, 5 U.S.C. § 3309; 5 C.F.R. § 302.201 (2012).
The OPM’s scoring formulation for veterans led to protracted litigation and even
temporary suspension of hiring ALJs from 1999 to 2003. BURROWS, supra note 28,
at 3:
The litigation arose out of changes that OPM made in 1996 to the
scoring formula that is used to rate and rank potential ALJs.
These changes . . . resulted in a scoring system that . . . [gave]
veterans a significant hiring advantage over non-veterans. As a
consequence, non-veteran applicants for ALJ positions sued,
claiming that the new scoring formula was unlawful.
See also Meeker v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 319 F.3d 1368, 1369–72 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(describing the litigation’s journey to the Federal Circuit). ALJs and agencies have
criticized the veterans’ preference because an additional ten points based on
veteran status can have a significant effect on the final list of candidates, whose
scores range from eighty to one hundred points. See Lubbers, supra note 2, at 115–
16 (“Since there is only a 20-point spread on scores among all ALJ eligibles (from
80 to 100), the addition of 5 to 10 veterans preference points to any score can
change by many places an eligible’s ranking on the register.”).
30
See BURROWS, supra note 28, at 2 (“Applicants who meet the[ ]
minimum qualification standards and pass the examination are then assigned a
score and placed on a register of eligible hires.”).
31
Artz et al., supra note 3, at 101.
32
See BURROWS, supra note 28, at 2–3 (“Agencies then select an ALJ
from the top three available candidates, taking into account the location of the
position, the geographical preference of the candidate, and veterans’ preference
rules.”).
33
Lubbers, supra note 2, at 117.
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Selective certification permits an agency, “upon a showing of
necessity and with the prior approval of OPM, . . . to appoint
specially certified eligibles without regard to their ranking in relation
to other eligibles . . . who lack the special certification.” 34 Numerous
agencies routinely engaged in selective certification from the 1960s
until the early 1980s, generally justified by needing ALJs with
technical knowledge and experience. 35 Yet after substantial criticism
that selective certification allowed agencies to hire ALJs with a more
“pro-enforcement attitude,” 36 the OPM ended selective certification
in 1984. 37 Much to ALJs’ alarm, 38 certain agencies have recently
sought to obtain waivers from the OPM to engage in selective
certification once again 39 and even appealed to Congress for
legislative dispensation from the OPM’s refusal. 40
Despite the OPM’s rejection of selective certification, ALJs
are dissatisfied with the OPM. In a 2008 report to President-elect
Obama, the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference argued
that the OPM should be divested of its authority to appoint and
34

Id.
See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 101; see also BURROWS, supra note 28,
at 5–6 (overviewing the history of selective certification from before the APA’s
enactment through the 1980s).
36
Lubbers, supra note 2, at 118.
37
See BURROWS, supra note 28, at 6 (“In 1984, OPM ended the selective
certification procedure in Examination Announcement No. 318. Agencies were no
longer allowed to formally require subject-matter expertise.”); see also 5 C.F.R.
§ 332.404 (2012) (requiring agency to select from the “highest three eligibles”).
38
See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 98, 101–02 (“We urge [the PresidentElect] to appoint agency heads who will respect, uphold, and enforce the provisions
of the APA regarding the federal agency administrative adjudication process. In
recent years, agency heads have been making legislative efforts to erode . . . the
APA provisions that ensure the independence of ALJ decision-making.”).
39
See BURROWS, supra note 28, at 6 (noting that the International Trade
Commission (“ITC”) and the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) have sought
selective-certification powers).
40
Artz et al., supra note 3, at 101–02 (noting that the ITC and the Federal
Trade Commission (“FTC”) both sought legislation to permit them to evade the
OPM’s refusal to permit selective certification). But see U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-14, RESULTS-ORIENTED CULTURES: OFFICE OF
PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT SHOULD REVIEW ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
PROGRAM TO IMPROVE HIRING AND PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT 8–10 (2010)
[hereinafter GAO-10-14] (reporting that the SSA and Health and Human Services
officials were pleased with the quality of ALJ candidates, although they sought
changes—such as by awarding bonus points to eligible candidates—to ensure that
the appointment considered “specialized knowledge”).
35
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review ALJs. 41 The ALJs complained that the OPM eliminated the
office that selected ALJs (by assigning that office’s duties to other
offices within the OPM), eliminated the requirement for ALJ
candidates to have litigation experience, 42 altered the ALJ-exam
schedule in a manner that rendered it “difficult for private sector
attorneys to apply,” 43 and sought to reward ALJs based on an
agency’s political goals. 44 Ultimately, the ALJs reported that “the
OPM . . . has sought to undermine ALJs[’] independence and
downgrade ALJs’ level of experience and competence.” 45 Partially in
response to ALJs’ concerns, the Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”) has recently recommended certain changes to Congress
concerning ALJ hiring and supervision. 46
B. Current ALJ Tenure Protections and Independence
Once selected, ALJs have certain protections from political
forces but limited independence in making final decisions. The APA
provides for a separation of functions between ALJs and certain
agency employees. ALJs may not perform investigative or
prosecutorial functions or report to an employee who does, or have
ex parte contacts concerning a fact at issue. 47 But heads of agencies

41

See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 106 (“[W]e advocate the creation of a
new independent agency . . . which would be responsible for the functions that the
OPM has been performing, or should have been performing . . . .”).
42
Id. at 105–06.
43
Id. at 106.
44
See id. at 105 (“[T]he OPM has taken the position that ALJs are no
different from other federal employees and should be covered by a ‘pay for
performance’ system that measures performance by agency (i.e., political) goals. If
implemented, OPM’s position would result in inappropriate agency influence over
the functions performed by ALJs . . . .”).
45
Id. at 106.
46
See GAO-10-14, supra note 40, at 26–28 (suggesting, among other
things, that ALJs become more involved in hiring and personnel-management
decisions).
47
5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1)–(2) (2006). Nevertheless, the ALJ may remain
responsible to the head of the agency, although the head of the agency also
oversees investigations and prosecutions. See id. § 554(d)(2)(C); Harold H. Bruff,
Specialized Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 329, 346 (1991)
(describing separation of powers for ALJs).
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can still set agency policy and supervise ALJs. 48 They have the
authority to reverse ALJs’ decisions in full, as to both fact and law. 49
Agencies, however, must provide some deference to ALJs’ witnessdemeanor observations 50 and consider the ALJs’ initial decision
during administrative appeal. 51
If unsatisfied with their power to reverse ALJ decisions,
agencies have a circumscribed ability to discipline and remove ALJs.
Agencies may remove and generally discipline ALJs only for “good
cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection
Board” after a formal administrative hearing. 52 The MSPB members,
like ALJs, also enjoy tenure protection because the President can
remove them “only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance
in office.” 53 Otherwise, ALJs essentially have life tenure because
they do not serve for a period of years in office. 54
ALJs’ effective life tenure, however, loses some of its sheen
because of the ambiguity of the good cause standard that governs
MSPB proceedings. 55 That standard has permitted removal for,
48

5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2)(C) (exempting the “agency or a member or
members of the body comprising the agency” from the separation-of-functions
requirement).
49
See id. § 557(b) (“On appeal from or review of the initial decision, the
agency has all the powers which it would have in making the initial decision except
as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule.”); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
340 U.S. 474, 494–95 (1951) (explaining that the APA permits agencies to decline
adopting an ALJ’s recommendations).
50
Timony, supra note 2, at 811 (citing Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at
496; E. Eng’g & Elevator Co. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 1980)).
51
Id. at 811–12 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 557(c) (1982)).
52
5 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
53
Id. § 1202(d).
54
See Verkuil, supra note 6, at 1344. Professor Verkuil argues that ALJs
have more secure tenure than bankruptcy and magistrate judges because ALJs are
not appointed to terms of office. See id. Although ALJs do not have to worry about
an essentially standardless judicial reappointment, cf. Tuan Samahon, Are
Bankruptcy Judges Unconstitutional? An Appointments Clause Challenge, 60
HASTINGS L.J. 233, 248 (2008) (“During 1998 to 2002, circuit courts reappointed
over 90% of those bankruptcy judges applying for reappointment.”), they can be
removed under what appears to be a more liberal tenure-protection provision by
another executive entity. See infra notes 55–62 and accompanying text.
55
Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321, 325 (1984); Harold J.
Krent & Lindsay DuVall, Accommodating ALJ Decision Making Independence
with Institutional Interests of the Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. NAT’L ASS’N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 34 (2005) (“[T]he meaning of ‘cause’ is unclear . . . .”).
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among other things, being absent for extended periods, declining to
set hearing dates, and having a “high rate of significant adjudicatory
errors.” 56 Moreover, the MSPB has indicated that insubordination
can constitute cause, although the Board left unclear how specific the
agency’s instructions and how overwhelming the agency’s evidence
of insubordination must be. 57
In light of the uncertain governing removal standard, perhaps
it is not surprising that more removal proceedings have been brought
against ALJs than against Article III judges. Article III judges retain
their appointments “during good Behavior”—a more demanding
standard than good cause—and are removed only after the
cumbersome interbranch-collaborative process of impeachment. 58
Only fifteen Article III judges have been impeached in more than two
hundred years. 59 In contrast, agencies have brought more than twenty
actions against ALJs from 1946 to 1992. 60 ALJs have noted these

56

BURROWS, supra note 28, at 8 (quoting A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY
ADJUDICATION 172 (Michael Asimov ed., 2003)).
57
Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. at 326, 331; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking: Lessons
from Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 506 (1990) (criticizing
MSPB’s insubordination dicta and its “abysmal ignorance of statistics” in
appearing to reject the Agency’s productivity argument). The MSPB, earlier in its
opinion, stated, “If the agency is basing its charge on reasons which constitute an
improper interference with the performance by an ALJ of his or her judicial
functions, the charge cannot constitute good cause.” Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. at 328.
58
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3; Goodman, 19
M.S.P.R. at 326 (citing McEachern v. Macy, 341 F.2d 895 (4th Cir. 1965))
(holding that good cause standard has been more broadly interpreted than goodbehavior standard); Benton v. United States, 488 F.2d 1017 (Ct. Cl. 1973); and
Chocallo v. Prokop, C.A. No. 80–1053 (D.D.C. Oct. 10, 1980), aff’d mem., 673
F.2d 551 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
59
Impeachments
of
Federal
Judges,
FED. JUD. CTR.,
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home. nsf/page/judges_impeachments.html (last visited
May 16, 2011). Three of the impeached judges resigned before the Senate’s
impeachment trials concluded. See id.
60
BURROWS, supra note 28, at 9; James E. Moliterno, The Administrative
Judiciary’s Independence Myth, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1191, 1222 n.150 (2006)
(citing Morell E. Mullins, Manual for Administrative Law Judges, 23 J. NAT’L
ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES i, 116 (2004)). Social Security Commissioner Michael
Astrue stated that fifty-eight ALJs have been disciplined since 2007, mostly for
deciding too few cases. See David Ingram, Social Security’s Disability Judges
Come Under Scrutiny, THE BLT: BLOG OF LEGALTIMES (July 11, 2011, 5:14 PM),
http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2011/07/social-securitys-disability-judges-come-
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removal attempts—especially the fifteen of which occurred over a
six-year period in the 1970s and 1980s 61—and the Social Security
Administration (“SSA”) Commissioner’s recent legislative proposal
to obtain authority to “discipline” ALJs for undefined “offenses”
without prior findings by the MSPB. 62
II. PRACTICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOMFORT
Recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions either create or
reenergize three significant issues surrounding ALJs’ current
selection and removal. First, does the method of ALJs’ selection
violate the Appointments Clause? Second, do ALJs’ tenure
protections improperly impede the President’s supervisory powers?
Finally, do ALJs’ current tenure protections (or reduced protections,
if required under Article II) create due process and fairness concerns?
Scholars have typically limited themselves to addressing the
appropriate balance between ALJ independence and subordination,
but without considering the three separation-of-powers concerns that
have come into sharper relief recently. Once the reader considers the
competing concerns below, the limitations of previously proposed
solutions and scholarship become apparent.
A. Improper Appointments?
The Appointments Clause governs the appointment of all
“Officers of the United States.” 63 Federal “[o]fficers” are those who
“exercise significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United
States.” 64 They fall into two categories—principal and inferior
officers. 65 Principal officers, most likely those who report directly to
under-scrutiny.html. But one ALJ was placed on administrative leave based on his
high approval of disability benefits. See id.
61
Bruff, supra note 47, at 348 (noting, in 1991, the “recent, sharp upturn
in the frequency of [ALJ] removal attempts”); Timony, supra note 2, at 807 & n.2
(listing cases).
62
Artz et al., supra note 3, at 103–04.
63
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508,
509–10 (1878).
64
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam).
65
Germaine, 99 U.S. at 509 (“The Constitution for purposes of
appointment very clearly divides all its officers into two classes [viz., ‘primary’ and
‘inferior’ officers].”) (quoted in Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 183 (1994)
(Souter, J., concurring) (referring to officers as “principal and inferior officers”)).
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the President, must be nominated by the President and confirmed by
the Senate. 66 But the so-called “Excepting Clause” 67 to the
Appointments Clause gives Congress flexibility in the appointing of
inferior officers, 68 that is, “officers whose work is directed and
supervised at some level by others who were appointed by
Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate”69
or officers of lesser importance as measured by some function of
their duties, tenure, and supervision. 70 Inferior officers may be
appointed in one of the following four ways, as Congress “think[s]
proper”: in the same manner as principal officers, by the President
alone, by a Court of Law, or by the Head of a Department. 71 The
Appointments Clause does not apply to those who are “mere
employees.” 72 A preliminary issue surrounding ALJs is whether they
are inferior officers or mere employees.
If they are inferior officers, many ALJs’ appointments are
likely improper. Although the Excepting Clause permits Congress to
bestow the appointment power of inferior officers on department
heads, Congress has not done so for all ALJs. Instead, Congress,
through the APA, permits “[e]ach agency” to select its ALJs “as are
necessary.” 73 Departments and agencies, despite their similarity, are
not identical. An “agency” is a statutory term that refers to “each
authority of the Government of the United States, whether or not it is
within or subject to review by another agency,” save for a few
enumerated exceptions. 74 But a “department” is a constitutional
animal that refers to a “freestanding component of the Executive
Branch, not subordinate to or contained within any other such
component” 75 with a “distinct province, in which a class of duties are

66

Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 659 (1997).
Id. at 660 (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at
627–28 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)).
68
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
69
Edmond, 520 U.S. at 663.
70
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988).
71
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
72
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 n.162 (1976) (per curiam) (citing
Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890); United States v. Germaine, 99
U.S. 508, 510 (1878)).
73
5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2006).
74
Id. § 551(1).
75
Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3163 (2010).
67
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[sic] allotted.” 76 Because an agency need not have the two key
characteristics of a department (independence and self-containment
from other administrative entities), not all agencies that appoint ALJs
are departments. Those ALJs selected by a nondepartment “agency”
are not properly appointed under the Appointments Clause. 77
But for the method of selection to acquire constitutional
import, ALJs must be officers, not mere employees. To determine
ALJs’ status, one must decide whether ALJs “exercis[e] significant
authority pursuant to the laws of the United States” 78 or serve as
“lesser functionaries” 79—an inquiry reminiscent of distinguishing
High Baroque from Rococo. 80 Yet, the determination is important
76

Id. at 3162 (quoting 1 N. WEBSTER, Department Definition, in
AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (photo. reprint 1995) (1828)
(def. 2)).
77
For each ALJ appointment, one must know which entity is appointing
and whether that entity is a department. Justice Breyer prepared a list of agencies
that employ ALJs in his dissent in Free Enterprise Fund. See Free Enter. Fund,
130 S. Ct. at 3214 app. C (Breyer, J., dissenting). Most federal ALJs work for the
SSA, see id., which is likely a department because it is independent and selfcontained. See 42 U.S.C. § 901(a) (2006). But several of the other listed agencies—
including the Food and Drug Administration, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, and the Drug Enforcement Administration, among others—may not
qualify as departments. See Kent Barnett, The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau’s Appointment with Trouble, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1459 (2011) (arguing that
the Court’s definition of “department” does not clarify whether independence and
self-containment are both necessary, or individually sufficient, characteristics for
departmental status); see also Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (Randolph, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting
that the FDIC abandoned its argument that the Office of Thrift Supervision, which
selected ALJs, was a department). By adopting my solution in Part IV, infra, one
can avoid this tedious, and perhaps ultimately indeterminate, inquiry into
departmental status for those agencies appointing numerous ALJs.
Moreover, if various agencies are not departments, the approbation
doctrine (i.e., a department head’s approval cures a subordinate’s otherwise
unconstitutional appointment) will not likely salvage the otherwise unconstitutional
appointments. The APA does not expressly permit department heads to approbate
subordinate agencies’ ALJ appointments, and thus any approbation would lack
statutory authority. See Barnett, supra, at 1481 n.161 (citing United States v.
Smith, 124 U.S. 525, 532–33 (1888); United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
385, 393–94 (1868)).
78
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam).
79
Id. at 126 n.162 (citing Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890);
United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 510 (1878)).
80
See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3178–82 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); Landry, 204 F.3d at 1132–34. The Office of Legal Counsel has
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because a “defect in [an ALJ’s] appointment [is] an irregularity
which would invalidate a resulting order.” 81
ALJs appear to exercise significant authority under federal
law. Their positions are established by law. 82 ALJs provide initial
decisions that establish factual findings and apply agency regulations
and policy. 83 ALJs have significant discretion to oversee discovery,
issue subpoenas, and sanction parties in regulatory, enforcement, and
licensing proceedings. 84 A party’s violation of certain ALJ orders can
lead to criminal penalties. 85 During administrative review, the agency
must provide some deference to the ALJ’s credibility findings and
consider the ALJ’s decision. 86 Within some agencies, these findings
are generally final. 87
In light of others whom the Supreme Court has deemed
inferior officers, ALJs’ authority seems more than sufficient to
provide similar status. The Court has held that district-court clerks,
thousands of clerks within the Treasury and Interior Departments, an
assistant surgeon, a cadet-engineer, election monitors, federal
marshals, military judges, Article I judges, and the general counsel
for the Transportation Department are inferior officers. 88 Perhaps,

prepared a lengthy memorandum that addresses characteristics that distinguish
employees from officers. Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant
Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the General
Counsels of the Executive Branch, Regarding Officers of the United States Within
the Meaning of the Appointments Clause 3 (Apr. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/2007 /appointmentsclausev10.pdf. The memo concludes
that an officer must have been delegated sovereign authority in a “continuing”
fashion. See id. But the drafters freely concede that “the Supreme Court has not
articulated the precise scope and application of the Clause’s requirements.” See id.
81
United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952).
82
Landry, 204 F.3d at 1133.
83
See Timony, supra note 2, at 812.
84
Landry, 204 F.3d at 1134 (comparing similar duties to special trial
judges within the U.S. Tax Court, whom the Supreme Court in Freytag v.
Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991), held were inferior officers); Timony,
supra note 2, at 812–13.
85
See Timony, supra note 2, at 813.
86
See id. at 811–12.
87
See id. at 812.
88
See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3179 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (citing cases).
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then, it is not surprising that five current Justices have suggested that
ALJs also rise to this level. 89
But Congress and the D.C. Circuit (the last court to have its
say on the issue) may think otherwise. Congress referred to ALJs in
the APA as “presiding employee[s],” 90 although this reference might
be understood as a lingering indignity from the ALJs’ “hearing
examiner” past. 91 Likewise, the D.C. Circuit held in Landry v. FDIC
that ALJs appointed by the Office of Thrift Supervision were
employees, despite their significant authority, because they have no
statutory authority to issue final opinions. 92 The majority concluded
that the Court in Freytag v. Commissioner held that special trial
judges for the U.S. Tax Court (“STJs”) were inferior officers only
because they had the power to issue final decisions. 93 The majority
acknowledged that the Freytag Court stated that it would not have
altered its conclusion even if the STJs’ nonfinal decisionmaking
powers were less significant. 94 But the Landry majority held that the
Freytag Court would not have then mentioned the STJs’ final
decisionmaking powers (which were not employed in the Freytag
case) unless those powers were “critical to the Court’s decision.” 95
Judge Randolph dissented in Landry and had the better
argument. As he demonstrated, the Freytag Court’s discussion of the
STJs’ finality power was part of an alternative holding, 96 provided
after the Court had announced its conclusion that “a special trial
judge is an inferior Office[r] whose appointment must conform to the

89

See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by three other justices); Freytag,
501 U.S. at 920 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment,
joined by Kennedy, J.). But see Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3160 n.10 (majority
opinion joined by Scalia and Kennedy, JJ.) (suggesting, in dicta, that ALJs may be
employees).
90
5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006); see also id. § 554(d) (referring to ALJs as
“[t]he employee who presides”). But see id. § 556(b)(3) (referring to ALJs as
“administrative law judges”).
91
See supra note 2.
92
Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2000); see also
Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco—A Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 71 (1979)
(describing ALJs’ inability to issue final decisions).
93
Landry, 204 F.3d at 1134.
94
Id. (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882).
95
Id. (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 882).
96
Id. at 1142 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
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Appointments Clause.” 97 The authority to issue final decisions thus
was not a necessary criterion. Indeed, federal magistrate judges, like
ALJs, provide only initial decisions that a district court may review
de novo, and they have long been deemed “inferior Officers” subject
to appointment by “Courts of Law.” 98 Moreover, had ALJs the power
to issue final decisions, they well could be transformed into principal
officers, whose “work [would not be] directed and supervised at
some level by others who were appointed by Presidential nomination
with the advice and consent of the Senate.” 99 Indeed, the Supreme
Court in Edmond v. United States held that the judges of the Coast
Guard Court of Criminal Appeals were inferior, not principal,
officers because they “have no power to render a final decision on
behalf of the United States unless permitted to do so by other
Executive officers.” 100 The agencies’ power to overrule, in other
words, merely establishes ALJs’ status as inferior officers.
Aside from this substantial constitutional concern, the ALJselection process is less than satisfactory to ALJs, agencies, and those
affected by agency adjudication. ALJs have complained about the
OPM’s lack of interest in the selection process and recently revised
selection criteria, 101 and scholars have complained about the
overbearing impact of the veterans’ preference. 102 The agencies, too,
have felt constrained by the Rule of Three and have sought a greater
role in selecting ALJs with expertise in the agencies’ subject

97

Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881.
Landry, 204 F.3d at 1143 (Randolph, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment) (citing Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
344, 352–54 (1931); Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 378 (1901); Pacemaker
Diagnostic Clinic, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 545 (9th Cir. 1984) (en
banc)). But see Stacy M. Lindstedt, Developing the Duffy Defect: Identifying Which
Government Workers Are Constitutionally Required to Be Appointed, 76 MO. L.
REV. 1143, 1178–80 (2011) (arguing that a government worker should be deemed
to have “significant authority” (as required for status as an “officer”) only if that
worker’s actions are “final,” as that term is understood under the APA).
99
Landry, 204 F.3d at 1142 (quoting Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S.
651, 663 (1997)).
100
Edmond, 520 U.S. at 665.
101
See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 105–06.
102
See, e.g., Lubbers, supra note 2, at 115–16 (describing how a ten-point
increase for certain veterans (1) substantially impacts eligible candidates’ ordering
because the scores have only a twenty-point range and (2) limits the number of
women candidates).
98
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matters. 103 Accordingly, even if current ALJ selection does not
violate the Appointments Clause, key actors in the selection
process—particularly ALJs and the agencies—are dissatisfied with
the current regime.
B. Improperly Impeding Presidential Supervision?
ALJs’ tenure protection also presents a substantial
constitutional question after Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB. 104 The
Court’s 5-4 decision in that case invalidated Congress’s use of two
layers of tenure protection to shield Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) members from the President’s
removal. 105 The SEC could appoint and remove PCAOB members.106
One (implied) tenure-protection provision protected members of the
SEC from the President’s at-will removal, 107 and a second (statutory)
tenure-protection provision protected PCAOB members from the
SEC’s at-will removal. 108 The Court invalidated this scheme because
the two tiers of tenure protection together unconstitutionally
impinged the President’s supervisory power by preventing him from
holding the SEC responsible for PCAOB’s actions in the same
manner as he could hold the SEC accountable for its other
responsibilities. 109
As Justice Breyer argued in his dissent, Free Enterprise Fund
suggests that ALJs’ tenure protections are also in jeopardy. 110 Like
PCAOB members, two tiers of tenure protection shield ALJs from
the President’s control. As for the first tier, ALJs may be removed
only for good cause, 111 meaning that “[ALJs] [a]re not to be . . .
discharged at the whim or caprice of the agency or for political
reasons.” 112 That good cause must be established by the MSPB, 113
whose members are shielded from the President’s at-will removal by
103

See supra notes 34–40 and accompanying text.
Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
105
Id. at 3147.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 3148–49.
108
Id. at 3148.
109
Id. at 3154.
110
Id. at 3180–81 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111
5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2006).
112
Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conf., 345 U.S. 128, 142 (1953).
113
5 U.S.C. § 7521(a).
104
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a second tier of tenure protection. 114 (Indeed, a third tier of tenure
protection may exist if the agency, such as the SEC, that may seek
removal is independent and has its own tenure protection. 115) Justice
Breyer argued that the majority’s decision suggested that “every
losing party before an ALJ now ha[s] grounds to appeal on the basis
that the decision entered against him is unconstitutional.” 116 The
majority responded that its “holding does not address . . . [ALJs],”
while suggesting that ALJs may be permitted additional protections
based on their ambiguous officer/employee status or their
adjudicative, as opposed to policymaking, functions. 117
The majority’s proposed distinctions 118 are unsound as stated,
devaluing the dicta for lower courts and rendering Justice Breyer’s
premonition all the more foreboding. First, the majority suggests,
without explanation, that Congress may limit the President’s
supervisory power over employees to a greater degree than
officers. 119 That the President needs supervisory control over
policymakers, however, does not mean that he should have less, as
opposed to equal, control over those who perform mostly ministerial,
yet often still discretionary and important, tasks. The President
should be able to oversee all people who implement executive policy
because doing so is necessary for the President to take care that the

114

Id. § 1202(d).
See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667, 701 n.9 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[Independent agency] is the term that
traditionally has been applied . . . to agencies . . . whose heads are not removable at
will.”), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
116
See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3181 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(noting that the holding does not specifically address this issue).
117
Id. at 3160 n.10 (majority opinion). I previously suggested another
manner of limiting the majority’s opinion to prevent the invalidation of ALJs’
tenure protections. See Kent Barnett, Avoiding Independent Agency Armageddon,
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1397–99 (2012) (arguing that the particular
combination of tenure protections for ALJs does not impermissibly interfere with
the President’s supervisory power).
118
Despite the majority’s eschewal or rejection of functionalism in Free
Enterprise Fund’s discussion of the President’s removal power, see Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., Cooperative Federalism, the New Formalism, and the
Separation of Powers Revisited: Free Enterprise Fund and the Problem of
Presidential Oversight of State-Government Officers Enforcing Federal Law, 61
DUKE L.J. 1599, 1602 (2012); infra note 191 and accompanying text, these
distinctions concerning ALJs are conspicuously functional.
119
Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3160 n.10.
115

666

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

33-2

law is faithfully executed. 120 After all, it would be odd, at the very
least, if the President were to have more control over cabinet
members confirmed by the Senate than the President’s own
administrative assistants.
Second, the President does not necessarily need less
supervisory authority over ALJs merely because they engage in
adjudication. 121 After all, “agencies use adjudication to form
policy.” 122 Indeed, certain agencies, such as the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB”), create policy primarily through
adjudication, not rulemaking. 123 Moreover, as Justice Breyer pointed
out in his dissent, the PCAOB members, like ALJs, also exercised
adjudicatory powers provided by statute, but the majority invalidated
their tenure protection anyway without mentioning those powers. 124
Nevertheless, as discussed in Parts IV.C.1 and IV.C.3 of this Article,
ALJs’ sole adjudicatory function—in formal proceedings—should
permit Congress to limit the President’s supervisory power over
ALJs without undermining the majority’s decision. 125
Ultimately, like the selection methods for ALJs, ALJs’ tieredtenure-protection provisions may or may not prove to be
constitutional. But at the very least, the Court has flagged a serious
issue concerning ALJs’ potentially excessive tenure protection. And
120

Compare generally id. (invalidating tenure protection for inferior
officers whom a department head of an independent agency appointed), with Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 173–74 (1926) (approving of Civil Service
protections, despite invalidating tenure protection for inferior officers appointed by
department heads of executive, as opposed to independent, agencies).
121
Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3160 n.10.
122
Bruff, supra note 47, at 356; accord SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S.
194, 202–03 (1947).
123
See John L. Gedid, ALJ Ethics: Conundrums, Dilemmas, and
Paradoxes, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 33, 38 n.23 (2002) (explaining how in its first
fifty years of existence the NLRB made all its decisions through adjudication and
did not promulgate a single rule).
124
Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3177 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
125
Although ALJs for a handful of agencies may (but rarely do) preside
over formal rulemaking proceedings, see supra note 4, their function is nearly
identical in these proceedings because they help prepare a formal record and, at
times, provide an initial decision. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, Final, But Often Fallible:
Recognizing Problems with ALJ Finality, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 53, 60 (2004).
Because the function of ALJs is essentially unchanged and ALJs are essentially
bound by the same APA requirements for both formal adjudication and rulemaking,
see 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (2006), their limited and rare ability to preside over
rulemaking should not require additional presidential supervisory power.
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this question, like the appointments question, can be resolved without
awaiting a definitive answer from the Supreme Court.
C. Insufficient Impartiality?
Whether or not the Court would invalidate ALJs’ tenure
protection, their limited independence raises impartiality, and thus
due process, concerns. Scholars have disagreed as to whether ALJs
are sufficiently independent to ensure their impartiality. Some
Supreme Court decisions, for their part, strongly suggest that ALJs’
independence suffices under the Due Process Clause, but their
limited rationales are not wholly satisfying. The Court’s recent
decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 126 however, may
suggest that the method of ALJs’ appointment and removal provides
too little independence. Although Caperton concerned state judicial
elections, its reasoning and concern over impartiality applies equally,
if not with more strength, to administrative adjudication.
My purpose here is not to describe or critique fully the
numerous arguments in academic literature concerning the nature and
breadth, whether normative or descriptive, of ALJ independence.
What follows, instead, is a brief synthesis of the arguments
concerning ALJ impartiality, a critical review of often-invoked
Supreme Court decisions, and an assessment of the impact that
Caperton and Free Enterprise Fund may have on the due process
issue. As with the ALJ appointment and presidential-supervision
concerns, the purpose here is merely to identify the significant
constitutional concern, not to resolve whether a constitutional
violation exists.
1. Brief Overview of the Impartiality Debate
Due process demands impartiality and fairness.127
Independence can further these values, but the amount of
126

556 U.S. 868 (2009).
See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (outlining situations in
which the probability of actual bias on the part of the decisionmaker is
constitutionally intolerable); Henry J. Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA.
L. REV. 1267, 1279–87 (1975) (describing the elements of a fair hearing); Krent &
DuVall, supra note 55, at 9–10 (stressing the importance of impartial adjudications
for ALJs); Christopher B. McNeil, The Model Act Creating a State Central
Hearing Agency: Promises, Practical Problems, and a Proposal for Change, 53
127
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independence necessary will depend upon the interest at issue and the
extent of the decisionmaker’s authority. 128 Because an ALJ has a role
in accomplishing “an agency task,” as opposed to reviewing the other
branches’ actions, she “cannot be entirely impartial.” 129 The question
is, then, whether ALJs are sufficiently independent to ensure
sufficient impartiality.
Some aspects of ALJ selection and removal suggest
insufficient independence to guarantee impartiality. The agency has
the ability to select the ALJ candidate (from the three submitted
candidates) whom it believes will be most sympathetic to agency
positions.130 The ALJ, perhaps regardless of his or her background or
predisposition to agency views, becomes inculcated with agency
prerogatives and concerns. 131 The agency often serves as a party to
an administrative proceeding and can initiate an ALJ’s removal. 132
Indeed, this “[r]emoval authority has always been associated with
control: It is the sine qua non of effective supervision—the guarantee
that subordinates will take direction.” 133 This concern over the
ADMIN. L. REV. 475, 479 (2001) (explaining that the hearing must be at a
meaningful time in a meaningful manner to fulfill the fundamental due process
requisite of providing “an opportunity to be heard”).
128
See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1214 (citing Stephen B. Burbank,
What Do We Mean by “Judicial Independence”?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 323, 325
(2003)) (arguing that independence is also not “an all-or-nothing” proposition and
that it is useful only to the extent that it furthers impartiality and separation of
powers).
129
Gedid, supra note 123, at 54; see also id. at 38 (“ALJs are not impartial
and neutral in the same sense as Article III judges, but frequently have a role in
developing and applying agency policy.”).
130
But the agency’s power seems similar to the President’s in selecting
Article III judges. The President often selects judicial candidates who are likely to
share the President’s judicial or political philosophy. And, indeed, the Senate and
the President can select candidates whom they perceive as favoring the federal
government’s position.
131
Pillai, supra note 2, at 124–25; see also Bruff, supra note 47, at 352
(“[T]hose who work within an agency are subject to a multitude of open or subtle
socializing pressures that do not reach a separate institution.”).
132
See Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 34–35 (discussing how agencies
oversee the conduct of ALJs to ensure competence and civility, and can remove
ALJs for good cause).
133
Ross E. Wiener, Inter-Branch Appointments After the Independent
Counsel: Court Appointment of United States Attorneys, 86 MINN. L. REV. 363,
421 (2001) (citing Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)); accord Free
Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157 (2010) (“The President has been
given the power to oversee executive officers; he is not limited . . . to persuading
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removal power becomes more urgent if ALJs’ tenure protections are
invalidated, as Justice Breyer fears, because the MSPB’s review of an
agency’s at-will removal of an ALJ would be meaningless. 134 Finally,
ALJs have indicated that agencies are perceived to interfere with ALJ
decisions, and twenty-six percent of ALJs for the SSA have
complained of Agency pressure to rule differently. 135 An ALJ’s
inculcation, appointment, and limited tenure protections create, the
argument goes, both apparent and actual bias concerns. 136
But ALJs have significant indicia of independence that
support their impartiality. The OPM, after scoring ALJ candidates,
limits agencies’ discretion in selecting candidates. 137 The agencies
can only initiate removal proceedings; they must convince another
independent agency that good cause exists for the ALJ’s removal.138
This tenure protection appears meaningful because, despite numerous
attempts, agencies have convinced the MSPB to remove only five
ALJs as of 2006. 139 Indeed, “it is generally understood [based on
statutory and constitutional restrictions] that presidential
supervision . . . should steer clear of interference in adjudications, no
matter who performs them.” 140 The APA promotes this
understanding by limiting the ALJs’ ex parte contacts with parties,141
limiting the duties that the agency can assign ALJs, 142 restricting

his unelected subordinates to do what they ought to do without persuasion. In its
pursuit of a ‘workable government,’ Congress cannot reduce the Chief Magistrate
to a cajoler-in-chief.” (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted)).
134
See supra Part II.B.
135
Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46
ADMIN. L. REV. 271, 280 (1994) (discussed in Moliterno, supra note 60, at nn.94 &
108); Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and
the Value of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 499 (1986) (“Evidence
suggests that various agencies have used the possibility of removal as a tool for
coercing decisions that are consistent with the agency’s wishes.”); see also Redish
& Marshall, supra, at 477 (“[I]f the adjudicator is himself an integral part of the
governmental body on the other side of the case, then it is likely that his decision
will be based on considerations other than the merits as developed by the
evidence.”).
136
Gedid, supra note 123, at 40 (citing Pillai, supra note 2, at 124–25).
137
See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text.
138
See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
139
Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1222 n.150.
140
Bruff, supra note 47, at 350.
141
5 U.S.C. §§ 554(d)(1), 557(d) (2006).
142
Id. § 554(d)(2).
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those who can directly supervise ALJs, 143 restricting the agencies’
ability to award “merit” pay or provide a performance rating, 144 and
expressly requiring ALJs to act impartially. 145
Indeed, indicia of independence may be irrelevant to, or at
least unnecessary for, impartiality. Only nine percent of non-SSA
ALJs report feeling pressured to rule differently. 146 And
administrative judges (“AJs”), who lack ALJs’ structural protections
and preside over informal administrative adjudications, 147 had less
anxiety over their impartiality and independence than ALJs.148
Surely, the argument goes, the APA’s statutory protections and
statistical evidence satisfy the minimal standards of due process,
especially in light of the Supreme Court’s ready acceptance of most
administrative procedures 149 and the indication from the AJs’
responses that independence has little effect on an administrative
adjudicator’s self-perception of impartiality.
2. Reassessing Existing Doctrine
Not surprisingly, scholars have disagreed as to whether ALJs
have sufficient indicia of impartiality. 150 Despite the absence of
143

Id.
Id. § 5372.
145
Id. § 556(b) (“The functions of presiding employees . . . shall be
conducted in an impartial manner.”).
146
Moliterno, supra note 60, at n.108 (citing Koch, supra note 135, at
278).
147
See, e.g., Philip G. Peters, Jr., Health Courts?, 88 B.U. L. REV. 227,
262 & n.249 (2008) (citing RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND PROCESS 309 (4th ed. 2004)) (stating that informal adjudication is often
presided over by AJs with lower pay and less independence from the agency).
148
See Koch, supra note 135, at 279. If ALJs lack sufficient indicia of
independence, then impartiality concerns over AJs, who lack ALJs’ protections,
would be even graver and threaten much of the federal administrative state.
Moreover, such a conclusion would also seem to bring Article I judges’
impartiality into question because they have independence that is similar to ALJs.
Although certain concerns underlying my proposal also apply to AJs and Article I
judges, I do not include them here because they do not likely face the same
Appointments Clause problems and because other factual distinctions exist
between them and ALJs.
149
Verkuil, supra note 6, at 1347–51.
150
Compare, e.g., Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 4 n.11 (“[T]he APA
protections insulate ALJs far more than due process dictates.”), McNeil, supra note
127, at 511 (“[D]ue process jurisprudence . . . [dispels] the notion that the measure
of due process to which litigants are entitled in administrative proceedings includes
144
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scholarly consensus, Professor Harold Bruff has stated that “the
Supreme Court has upheld this general arrangement against due
process attack.” 151 Three Supreme Court decisions routinely come to
the APA’s defense in a Constitution-based impartiality challenge:
Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 152 Butz v.
Economou, 153 and Withrow v. Larkin. 154 Although certain of these
decisions strongly suggest that ALJs are sufficiently impartial in fact
and appearance, scholars have not considered the impact of the
decisions’ limitations, especially after Caperton and Free Enterprise
Fund.

an independent adjudicator possessed of salary and tenure protection . . . .”), and
Verkuil, supra note 6, at 1347–51 (arguing that ALJs need only so much
independence as to ensure their impartiality and suggesting that impartiality exists),
with 2 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 442–43 (1959) (contending that
relationship between agency and ALJ creates actual and apparent bias), Gedid,
supra note 123, at 40 (“[T]here is a strong argument that . . . for ALJ independence
to exist, the ALJ cannot be ‘beholden’ to the agency for which she works for
compensation, tenure, and/or conditions of employment.” (citing Richard B.
Hoffman & Frank P. Cihlar, Judicial Independence: Can It Be Without Article III?,
46 MERCER L. REV. 863, 864–65 (1995))), Levinson, supra note 25, at 537–38
(noting uncertainty as to ALJs’ impartiality), Lubbers, supra note 2, at 110 (stating
that “ALJs . . . are subject to doubts about their independence due in part to their
employment,” but not resolving whether ALJs are sufficiently independent or
impartial), Redish & Marshall, supra note 135, at 499, 504 (arguing that ALJs need
salary and tenure protection similar or identical to Article III judges to preserve due
process), Timony, supra note 2, at 828 (concluding that agencies’ ability to proceed
against an ALJ creates an “appearance of impropriety”), and Karen Y. Kauper,
Note, Protecting the Independence of Administrative Law Judges: A Model
Administrative Law Judge Corps Statute, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 537, 544
(1985).
151
Bruff, supra note 47, at 346 (referring to Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.
35 (1975)); id. at 347 (“Most administrative adjudication is not very vulnerable to
constitutional invalidation under the due process clause.”); see also Verkuil, supra
note 6, at 1350–51.
152
345 U.S. 128 (1953).
153
438 U.S. 478 (1978).
154
421 U.S. 35 (1975). In Weiss v. United States, the Supreme Court
upheld the use of military judges despite their lack of a fixed term in office or
lifetime tenure. See 510 U.S. 163, 179–81 (1994). But Weiss’s applicability to the
civil administrative state is indeterminate. On one hand, the Court’s opinion
suggests that lifetime or termed tenure is unnecessary for adjudicators who are
subject to removal by the executive branch. On the other hand, the Court refused to
apply Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), because that case applied in civil
contexts, suggesting that Mathews’s three-part balancing test may require more.
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Ramspeck, for instance, has limited relevance. In Ramspeck,
ALJs challenged certain rules governing ALJs, which the precursor
to the OPM and the MSPB (the Civil Service Commission)
promulgated under the APA. 155 No constitutional question was posed
or answered. In rejecting the ALJs’ contention that reductions in
force were impermissible under the APA, the Court stated that
Congress intended ALJs “not to be paid, promoted, or discharged at
the whim or caprice of the agency or for political reasons.” 156 And
the Court referred to ALJs as “partially independent” 157 and “semiindependent subordinate hearing officers.” 158 But these descriptions
of congressional intent do not answer whether Congress successfully
effectuated its intent, whether the protections provide sufficient
impartiality, or whether the protections offend the President’s
supervisory power.
The two remaining cases, however, are more germane. In
Butz, an individual brought suit against certain Department of
Agriculture officials who took part in an administrative
adjudication. 159 He asserted several causes of action, including those
premised on violations of the Due Process Clause. 160 The sole issue
that the Supreme Court resolved concerned the nature of immunity to
which the various officials were entitled. 161 As in Ramspeck, the
Court did not decide whether ALJs have sufficient impartiality, but it
hinted as much. In determining that ALJs were entitled to absolute
judicial immunity, the Court stated that ALJs were “functionally
comparable” to judges 162 and listed the APA’s panoply of protections
to “guarantee [ALJs’] independence.” 163 Indeed, absolute immunity
“preserv[ed ALJs’] independent judgment.” 164 Nevertheless, the
decision does not discuss (at least in any detail) the power of removal
155

See Ramspeck, 345 U.S. at 134 (outlining the arguments of each party).
Id. at 142.
157
Id. at 131.
158
Id. at 132.
159
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 481–82 (1978).
160
See id. at 482–83.
161
See id. at 485 (rejecting the United States’ argument that federal
officials are immune from damages liability even if the violation was knowing, was
deliberate, and infringed constitutional rights).
162
Id. at 513; accord Ass’n of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F.
Supp. 1132, 1141 (D.D.C. 1984).
163
Butz, 438 U.S. at 514.
164
Id.
156
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and the internal pressures that weigh on ALJs as agency officials
despite the powerful force that the Free Enterprise Fund Court would
later understand the removal power to have, 165 much less explain
why the APA’s protections are sufficient to ensure impartiality.
Withrow likewise suggests that ALJs have sufficient
impartiality, but it, too, is not dispositive. In Withrow, a doctor
challenged the ability of a licensing board to preside over a
nonadversary, investigatory hearing and also a later adversary, merits
hearing. 166 The Court unanimously upheld the arrangement. The
Court noted that it sought to “prevent even the probability of
unfairness” 167 and that a challenge to the administrative structure
would have to “overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in
those serving as adjudicators,” 168 in light of “a realistic appraisal of
psychological tendencies and human weakness.” 169 But the Court
found no problem because the board was merely determining
whether a full hearing was necessary, much like a judicial officer
rendering a probable cause determination, without deciding whether
a regulatory violation actually occurred. 170 And the Court indicated
that the Due Process Clause does not require separated investigative
and adjudicatory functions for agency members. 171
Withrow does not fully address the plight of ALJs. The
Court’s opinion, like that in Butz, does not address the effect of the
removal power on an adjudicator’s impartiality. Indeed, it does not
address ALJs at all. Instead, Withrow concerns the heads of
agencies. 172
Perhaps one might argue that if agency heads can investigate,
prosecute, adjudicate, and overrule ALJs’ opinions in toto, there
should be little concern over their subordinates’ impartiality. But that
argument overlooks ALJs’ functional judicial status and the different
expectations that parties have before a judge as opposed to an agency
165

See supra Part II.B (discussing significance of Free Enterprise Fund).
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 39–41 (1975).
167
Id. at 47.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
See id. at 53–58 (explaining why board’s behavior was acceptable).
171
See id. at 52 (explaining that case law, and federal and state courts,
support this contention).
172
See id. at 55 n.20 (noting that the Agency employee actually performed
the investigation and an assistant attorney general presented the evidence to the
board).
166
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member. 173 The ALJ is a neutral individual whose opinion the agency
must review, and the ALJ’s neutrality and opinion have a meaningful
procedural and substantive effect. Although the agency can (but
rarely does) reverse an ALJ’s decision, the substance of the ALJ’s
opinion may matter for judicial review under the APA. The courts
will review only agency decisions adverse to a nonagency party
(because if the party prevails before the agency, the agency will not
appeal its own adverse decision, which it has the power to reverse, to
the courts). The ALJ’s opinion—especially as to facts and
credibility—helps the court determine the matter with the additional
help of an educated neutral’s view. 174 The ALJ’s proceedings and
opinion also provide an administrative procedure to help protect
fundamental rights in adjudication and thereby create for the parties
the reasonable expectation of a fair, impartial proceeding. In short,
the ALJ’s place within the federal administrative apparatus does not
mean that impartiality and its concomitant indicia of independence
are irrelevant.

173

The Withrow Court also referred to Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 410 (1971). See Withrow, 421 U.S. at 49–50. In Perales, the Supreme Court
rejected a social security claimant’s argument that the ALJ’s duty to develop the
record in nonadversarial hearings violated the Due Process Clause. The Court held
that doing so would “assume[] too much and would bring down too many
procedures designed, and working well, for a governmental structure of great and
growing complexity.” See Perales, 402 U.S. at 410. This conclusion is sound
because the ALJ was not an advocate for the Agency; the Agency was
unrepresented. But the Perales Court’s reasoning is not satisfying. The Court
merely offers unsupported conclusions that (1) the procedures are “working well”
and (2) the procedures satisfy due process because the government, which creates,
implements, and potentially benefits from the procedures, has made them
ubiquitous. See id. Moreover, like Butz and Withrow, Perales does not address
whether a sharp Damoclean sword of removal dulls the ALJ’s impartiality. Perhaps
the better support for sufficient impartiality is found in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 271 (1970) (“We agree . . . that prior involvement in some aspects of a case
will not necessarily bar a welfare official from acting as a decision maker.”).
174
See, e.g., Novelty, Inc. v. DEA, 571 F.3d 1176, 1180–81 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (Henderson, J., concurring) (“The DEA is the ultimate fact finder but ‘[t]he
agency's departures from the [ALJ’s] findings are vulnerable if they fail to reflect
attentive consideration to the [ALJ’s] decision.’ ” (quoting Greater Bos. Tel. Corp.
v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 853 (D.C. Cir. 1970))); Bos. Edison Co. v. FERC, 885 F.2d
962, 968–69 (1st Cir. 1989); see infra note 195 (explaining that courts carefully
view agency findings contrary to ALJ factual findings).
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3. Caperton and Free Enterprise Fund’s Impact on Existing Doctrine
Even if Ramspeck, Butz, and Withrow together established
that ALJs have sufficient impartiality, the Court’s more recent
decision in Caperton may suggest otherwise. Indeed, Caperton does
what those decisions did not: it focuses on adjudicators’ selection and
removal, albeit in the judicial-election context. In Caperton, the
president of a corporate defendant, which was in the process of
appealing an unfavorable verdict, had contributed three million
dollars to have Justice Benjamin elected to the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals. 175 Justice Benjamin defeated the
incumbent justice by fewer than fifty thousand votes. 176 In response
to recusal motions, Justice Benjamin said that he had no actual bias
and that there was no allegation of a quid pro quo arrangement. 177
The U.S. Supreme Court held that due process required
Justice Benjamin’s recusal. 178 Evidence of a quid pro quo agreement
or of actual bias was unnecessary. 179 Instead, the Court was
“concerned with a more general concept of interests that tempt
adjudicators to disregard neutrality.” 180 The Court was looking not
necessarily for Withrow’s “probability of unfairness,” 181 but instead
an “unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’ ” 182 The Court suggested
that such bias exists
“when a person with a personal stake in a particular
case had a significant and disproportionate influence
in placing the judge on the case by raising funds or
175

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 873 (2009).
See id. (noting Justice Benjamin received 382,036 votes while his rival
received 334,301 votes).
177
See id. at 872–75, 886 (reviewing facts of case).
178
See id. at 884–87 (explaining reasons for holding).
179
See id. at 884–85 (arguing that risk of bias was substantial enough).
180
Id. at 878.
181
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
182
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881 (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400
U.S. 455, 465–66 (1971)). The Court enunciated another standard besides the
“probability of unfairness” and the “unconstitutional potential for bias.” The Court
also indicated that it was looking for “the probability of actual bias [that] rises to an
unconstitutional level.” Id. at 887. Perhaps these three standards can be reconciled.
The “probability of actual bias” may be the same as the “probability of unfairness,”
with the unfairness being the actual bias. The “potential for bias” may be
unconstitutional only when it rises to the level of the probability of actual bias.
176
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directing the judge’s election campaign when the case
was pending or imminent. . . . [S]imilar fears of bias
can arise when—without the other parties’ consent—a
man chooses the judge in his own cause.” 183
Applying this standard, the Court noted that the president of the
defendant-corporation knew that the appeal from an unfavorable
verdict was pending, the election was decided by fewer than fifty
thousand votes, and the president’s contributions had a significant
and disproportionate impact on the election. 184 Because of this, the
Court found “a serious, objective risk of actual bias that required
Justice Benjamin’s recusal” because it appeared that the defendant
“ch[ose] the judge in [its] own cause.” 185
Although the Court discussed its decision within the judicialelection context, 186 its reasoning seems even more compelling when
applied to ALJs. Caperton appears to consider a party’s impact on a
judge’s selection and perhaps the effect that a losing party could have
to punish the judge who it helped place on the bench in future
judicial elections. West Virginia voters directly chose Justice
Benjamin. Nevertheless, the corporate defendant’s disproportionate
contributions’ indirect impact on the election created an
“unconstitutional potential for bias.” The government, like the
defendant in Caperton, is frequently a party to proceedings before the
ALJ. But the government directly chooses the ALJ from a list of
three candidates presented to it. If agencies obtain the ability to
engage in selective certification, their ability to appoint is even more
unbounded. In either case, the agency directly and literally “chooses
the judge in [its] own cause,” without, as in the case of federal
judges, any approval from another branch. Moreover, the agency is
the party that can initiate removal proceedings against the ALJ, not
merely indirectly fund opposition forces in a later election. Indeed, it
is not even the government in general that selects ALJs and initiates
removal proceedings; it is the very agency that appears before the
ALJ. Because the agency’s role in selecting and removing the ALJ is
much more direct than in Caperton, it is difficult to see how an
183

Id. at 870.
Id. at 885–86.
185
Id. at 886, 902.
186
Id. at 881–82 (“This problem arises in the context of judicial elections,
a framework not presented in the precedents we have reviewed and discussed.”).
184
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“unconstitutional potential for bias” does not exist for federal ALJs if
Caperton applies outside of the judicial-election context.
Moreover, as discussed previously in Part II.B, Free
Enterprise Fund suggests that the President must have sufficient
supervisory power over all members of the executive branch so that
the President can be held accountable for what his or her agents do.
To ensure the President’s supervisory power, the Court has begun
limiting tenure protections for executive officials, such as the
PCAOB members. 187 If the Court were to follow suit with ALJs and
permit the President or a principal officer to remove ALJs for any
reason, it is difficult to see how an “unconstitutional potential for
bias,” or indeed a “probability of actual bias” would not exist. The
President or a supervising officer could, despite potential political
backlash, have the ALJ find facts or apply law in certain ways.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that “one who holds his office
only during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to
maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will.” 188 A
challenge to the President’s supervision of ALJs may not be merely a
theoretical matter, given the Court’s recent, solicitous reception to
separation-of-powers challenges. 189
Functional limitations on the President’s supervisory power—
such as the understood ability of ALJs to act without agency
interference 190 and ALJs’ APA protections—may be less, if at all,
relevant to due process and removal-power inquiries after Free
Enterprise Fund. That decision strongly suggests that practical
indicia of independence or control are normally immaterial to the
187

See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010)
(agreeing with the government that unconstitutional tenure provisions are
severable).
188
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935).
189
See generally Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011) (holding that
bankruptcy court lacked authority under Article III to enter judgment on state-law
counterclaim); Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3150–51 (deciding separation-ofpowers issues on interlocutory review); Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182–
83 (1995) (discussing claim, based on Appointments Clause of Article II of the
Constitution, that there was a “ ‘trespass upon the executive power of appointment’
”).
190
See supra note 140 and accompanying text; cf., e.g., Russell L.
Weaver, Management of ALJ Offices in Executive Departments and Agencies, 47
ADMIN. L. REV. 303, 321 (1995) (“ALJs who serve at agencies that have non-ALJ
administrators repeatedly indicated that those administrators have not attempted to
interfere with their decisional independence.”).
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President’s removal-power inquiry because the Court rejected Justice
Breyer’s functional inquiry that considered other, more meaningful
methods of presidential control, such as rulemaking powers. 191
Instead, the Court looked only to the President’s removal power and
held that the lack of sufficient removal power in the PCAOB scheme
alone impeded the President’s supervisory power. 192 Supervision is
merely the flipside to independence. If the removal power is
significant and apparently necessary for adequate presidential
supervision, the removal power should have a similar, inverse impact
on independence and impartiality. The limited ability of Congress
after Free Enterprise Fund to rely on functional methods of control
and independence is what, in part, may render the ALJ’s quandary so
difficult to solve.
Finally, the agency’s ability to overrule an ALJ on both fact
and law does not mean that an ALJ’s decision is meaningless. 193 The
ALJ’s credibility findings can be very significant, affecting whether
substantial evidence exists for an agency’s contrary decision on
administrative appeal. 194 Indeed, courts review with a more careful
eye agency findings that are contrary to ALJs’ factual findings.195
Considering appellate courts’ more deferential review of final agency
action as compared to lower court factual findings, 196 ALJs’
191

See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3155–56 (refuting dissent’s
position); id. at 3170–73 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing how the SEC controls
PCAOB’s adjudicatory and rulemaking authority).
192
See id. at 3158–59 (discussing threat posed by insufficient removal
power); see also id. at 3156–57 (discussing Framers’ view of importance of
removal power).
193
See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006) (describing ALJ’s initial decision
authority); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 494–97 (1951)
(explaining importance of findings of examiner); Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1225
(acknowledging weight of authority given to ALJ decisions).
194
See Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. at 496–97 (noting legislative
committee reports emphasize importance of ALJ decisions); see also Penasquitos
Vill., Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1079–81 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusing to enforce
NLRB’s order and reversing an ALJ’s determination that relied exclusively on
testimony that the ALJ discredited).
195
Penasquitos Vill, Inc., 565 F.2d at 1078 (referring to NLRB v. Tom
Johnson, Inc., 378 F.2d 342, 344 (9th Cir. 1967), and NLRB v. Interboro
Contractors, Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 499 (2d Cir. 1967)).
196
See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 162–63 (1999) (explaining that
the “ ‘substantial evidence’ standard [for review of agency decisions] . . . is
somewhat less strict than the [clearly erroneous standard for the review of lower
court factual findings]”); accord Chen v. Mukasey, 510 F.3d 797, 801 (8th Cir.
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impartiality may be even more important than Article III judges’
impartiality.
Despite concerns over ALJ impartiality and despite Caperton
and Free Enterprise Fund’s contrary suggestion, the Supreme Court
may not find a due process violation, given its wariness of upsetting
long-standing administrative practices. 197 But the absence of
constitutional infirmity does not mean that the current administrative
system is in excellent health. These concerns, like those that surround
ALJs’ selection and removal, support finding a new process of ALJ
selection and removal that all interested constituencies can champion.
III. OTHER PROPOSED, YET INCOMPLETE, REFORMS
Scholars and ALJs have proposed various changes to ALJs’
selection, removal, and independence. Some of the most promising
proposals, discussed below, include the creation of a unified ALJ
corps with a newly established supervising agency, ALJ selfregulation, and even the provision of Article III protections to ALJs.
But these proposals fail to consider, much less resolve, all three
separation-of-powers issues surrounding ALJs. Each of these
proposals thus has—befitting ALJs’ current demigod status—an
Achilles heel. 198
A. Unified Corps
Perhaps the most popular remedial proposal is for a unified
ALJ corps (sometimes referred to as an ALJ central panel), appointed
and supervised by an existing or newly created independent
agency. 199 Under this proposal, ALJs are not appointed by or
2007) (“The substantial evidence standard . . . is more deferential than the ‘clearly
erroneous’ standard . . . .”).
197
See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971).
198
In fairness to these proposals’ advocates, I am not aware of any
scholarship that directly examines all three problems. Moreover, the problematic
nature of the ALJs’ tiered-tenure protections, among other things, did not arise in
any substantial way until June 2010 with Free Enterprise Fund.
199
See, e.g., Lubbers, supra note 2, at 123–24 (discussing intensified
movement for a unified administrative trial court or centralized corps of judges);
Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1227–33 (articulating support that the proposal for a
central panel has received); Scalia, supra note 92, at 79 (explaining improper
influence issue could be resolved with a unified ALJ corps). Similarly, the Federal
ALJ Conference has proposed transferring the OPM’s selection assistance of ALJs
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assigned to a specific agency. Instead, a corps of ALJs, whose
members an independent agency appoints, hears cases from various
agencies. 200 Some of the central-panel proposals would permit ALJs
to issue final decisions. 201
A federal ALJ corps, however, does not likely resolve the
three separation-of-powers concerns. The independent agency’s
appointment of ALJs would likely comply with the Appointments
Clause because the independent agency, if “not subordinate to or
contained within any other [executive] component,” would constitute
a “department.” 202 But the presidential-supervision concerns remain
because, without further changes to the current appointment process,
two tiers of tenure protections would continue to shield ALJs from
the President’s control. The appointing agency would be independent
because of tenure protection for its head. 203 And ALJs presumably
would likewise receive the tenure protection that they currently
possess. 204 If one or both of the tenure-protection provisions are
invalidated, substantial due process concerns may exist because the
new appointing and removing agency—which may not be
and other responsibilities to a new independent agency, the Administrative Law
Judge Conference. See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 105–07 (discussing history and
reasons for proposal); see also Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 38–40
(suggesting creation of an independent oversight agency and discussing
California’s Agency that oversees judicial conduct). But doing so would not
address any of the three stated concerns because it merely transfers currently
existing powers from one independent agency—that ALJs think has generally
ignored them—to another more sympathetic one. This transfer does not have heads
of departments actually appoint ALJs, alter the President’s supervisory power, or
address ALJ independence.
200
See McNeil, supra note 127, at 480 (pointing out consistency of
independence of ALJs with due process requirements); Jim Rossi, Overcoming
Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and Institutional Design, 53 ADMIN.
L. REV. 551, 568 (2001) (describing how corps of ALJs promotes adjudicative
independence).
201
See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1230 (comparing a central panel of
ALJs to Article III judges).
202
See supra note 75 and accompanying text (defining “department”).
203
See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 537 F.3d 667, 701 n.9 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“[Independent agency] is the term that
traditionally has been applied . . . to agencies . . . whose heads are not removable at
will.”), rev’d 130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010).
204
See 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (2006) (listing possible actions against ALJs);
MODEL ACT CREATING A STATE CENTRAL HEARING AGENCY § 1–6(a)(3), (a)(4)
(1997) (listing reasons for removal).
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independent after a tiered-tenure-protection analysis—may attempt to
influence ALJs’ decisions improperly. 205 Moreover, even if the
tenure protections are permissible under Article II, any attempt to
give ALJs the power to issue final decisions places policy control
within the ALJs, not the agencies themselves, and thus limits the
President’s ability to ensure that the law is faithfully executed. 206
Yet, even if an ALJ central panel did cure all three problems,
a federal ALJ corps is not likely in the offing. Numerous states have
created ALJ corps, 207 which have received universal praise. 208 Many
members of the committee that proposed the federal APA to
Congress advocated an ALJ corps. 209 And since then, many scholars,
committees, members of the bar, a congressman, and ALJs have
joined the unsuccessful crusade. 210 Even so, by 1992 the
205

See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text (explaining probable
bias that may occur if President could remove ALJs for any reason); see also
Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Special Problems of State Administrative Law Judges, 53
ADMIN. L. REV. 403, 417 (2001) (proposing that ALJ corps is “removable only for
good cause and, then, only after notice and an opportunity to be heard by an
impartial tribunal”); Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 45 (explaining that ALJs in
certain states, such as Texas, can be removed at will by the Chief ALJ).
206
Cf. Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, ALJ Independence, and
Administrative Courts: The Recent Changes in Louisiana’s Administrative
Procedure Act, 59 LA. L. REV. 431, 463 (1999) (noting separation-of-powers
problems that arose when Louisiana permitted ALJs to issue final decisions from
which a losing agency could not appeal).
207
Rossi, supra note 200, at 568; see Patricia E. Salkin, Judging Ethics for
Administrative Law Judges: Adoption of a Uniform Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Administrative Judiciary, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 7, 13 n.18 (2002) (listing
twenty-four states that have adopted central panels).
208
See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1229 (citing Thomas E. Ewing,
Oregon’s Hearing Officer Panel, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 57, 89
(2003); Allen C. Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the
1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 75, 78 (1994); Bruce H. Johnson, Strengthening
Professionalism Within an Administrative Hearing Office: The Minnesota
Experience, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 445, 446 (2001)). Nonetheless, a common criticism
of the ALJ corps is that agencies lose the efficiency and specialized knowledge that
exists when ALJs are housed within individual agencies. See, e.g., Pierce, supra
note 57, at 516.
209
See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1227.
210
See Lubbers, supra note 2, at 123–24 (explaining the LaMacchia
Committee’s 1973 recommendation for study of an ALJ corps and former ABA
President Bernard Segal’s advocacy for an independent ALJ corps in 1976); id. at
124 (advocating “increased scrutiny” for the ALJ corps proposal); Moliterno, supra
note 60, at 1229 (collecting scholarly and ALJ proposals); see also GAO-10-14,

682

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

33-2

Administrative Conference of the United States (“ACUS”)
recommended that Congress not create an ALJ corps. 211 Given the
ACUS’s lack of support for an ALJ corps and the proposal’s failure
to gain political traction after more than sixty years, the proposal to
create a federal ALJ corps appears moribund.
B. Self-Regulation
Another set of proposals grants ALJs the power to selfregulate. Other professions, such as Article III judges, lawyers, and
physicians, regulate the conduct of their members. 212 Indeed, because
Federal Judicial Councils monitor judicial behavior, Congress has
largely avoided regulating judges. 213 Under one general proposal,
ALJs would be permitted to create an ethics code, 214 investigate
alleged ALJ wrongdoing, and impose sanctions for inappropriate
conduct. 215 Under another self-regulation proposal, a new
independent agency of ALJs would assume the OPM’s current ALJselection-assistance duties, improve the formal administrative
adjudicatory process, and ensure compliance with ethical
standards. 216
These proposals do not address appointment, removal, or
impartiality concerns. Neither proposal alters ALJs’ current
questionable method of selection by heads of agencies who are not
heads of departments. Neither appears to alter ALJs’ two tiers of
tenure protection or the existing removal mechanisms, and thus
supra note 40, at 22 (“The ALJ Corps option was proposed repeatedly in Congress
between 1983 and 1995.”); Scalia, supra note 92, at 79 (discussing ALJ corps’s
beneficial effect on efficiency and likely detrimental effect on accountability and
supervision); Timony, supra note 2, at 819 (discussing Senator Heflin’s 1983 bill
to create a unified corps).
211
See Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1228 (referring to PAUL R. VERKUIL
ET AL., ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY
1059 (1992)).
212
Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 43–45.
213
Id. at 43.
214
ALJs’ unsettled ethical duties are a perennial subject of academic
discussion. See generally Salkin, supra note 207, at 7–32; Ronnie A. Yoder, The
Role of the Administrative Law Judge, 22 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 321,
321–48 (2002); Diana Gillis, Note, Closing an Administrative Loophole: Ethics for
the Administrative Judiciary, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 863, 863–76 (2009).
215
Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 43.
216
See Artz et al., supra note 3, at 106–07.
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neither proposal gives the ALJs more than the power to recommend
or impose certain adverse action against a derelict ALJ. Because
ALJs’ selection and removal are essentially left unaltered under both
proposals, self-regulation would have a minimal impact on
impartiality concerns. The failure to consider the selection bias, the
agency-view inculcation, and threat of removal renders the
promulgation and enforcement of an ethics code an ineffective tool to
improve actual and perceived ALJ impartiality.
C. Article III Protections
A third suggestion provides ALJs essentially the same tenure
protections that Article III judges enjoy. To combat agency pressure
on ALJ decisionmaking, two prominent scholars have proposed
giving ALJs lifetime salary protection and permitting their removal
only through a statutory-impeachment process. 217 This proposal
should remedy any lingering due process concerns, even after
Caperton and Free Enterprise Fund, because ALJs would have the
same independence as Article III judges, although that independence
would arise from statutory, not constitutional, law. 218
But this proposal does not resolve appointment or supervision
concerns. The proposal fails to alter ALJs’ selection, leaving heads of
agencies, as opposed to departments, to select some ALJs. 219
Moreover, it would exacerbate presidential-supervision concerns. To
be sure, this reform would remove one tier of tenure protection and
thus may, at a superficial level, solve the problem presented in Free
Enterprise Fund. Yet removal through impeachment completely
deprives the executive branch of power to seek an ALJ’s removal
217

See Redish & Marshall, supra note 135, at 499; see also id. at 504
(“[D]ue process is inadequately protected when an individual must depend on an
adjudicator who lacks salary and tenure protection (such as most state court judges
and all ALJs) to protect an entitlement to a life, liberty, or property interest.”).
Redish and Marshall’s proposal is vague as to whether the salary and tenure
protections are lifetime protections. They do not use the term “lifetime,” but they
do mention the protections and then state that “ALJs would then be shielded from
such pressures in much the same way that article III judges are.” See id. at 499.
218
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. But others have concluded that Article III
protections are unnecessary under due process jurisprudence. See McNeil, supra
note 127, at 511; Daniel J. Meltzer, The Judiciary’s Bicentennial, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 423, 433 (1989) (suggesting that salary and tenure protections may render
judges more political, not apolitical).
219
See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
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because the House of Representatives, not the executive branch,
initiates impeachment proceedings. 220 Thus, even if this proposal
resolves due process concerns, it leaves unaddressed Appointments
Clause problems and presidential-supervision difficulties of the
highest magnitude.
IV. AN INTERBRANCH-APPOINTMENT REMEDY
These proposals, even if incomplete or politically unpalatable,
demonstrate the widespread sense that ALJs are not operating, to
paraphrase Voltaire’s Dr. Pangloss, in the best of all possible
worlds. 221 In the spirit of creating a better administrative world, I
propose that Congress assign the power to appoint (and the incidental
power to discipline and remove) ALJs to the “Courts of Law,”
namely the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. I first briefly
outline the key portions of my statutory proposal for the D.C. Circuit
to appoint and discipline ALJs. I then further explain why I have
structured the proposal as I have to resolve the three constitutional
questions and address agencies’ and ALJs’ concerns. Although, as
discussed above, other structural proposals have tended to disappear
into the political ether, my proposal may be able to gain more
traction because it gives, through a relatively simple statutory
change, both agencies and ALJs some, but not all, of what they want.
A. General Mechanics of an ALJ Interbranch Appointment
Under a new statute and its implementing rules, the D.C.
Circuit should appoint, discipline, and remove ALJs. The court has
the knowledge, time, and logistics to do so. It is widely considered
220

If the proposed statutory impeachment models constitutional
impeachment, the House of Representatives would impeach ALJs, and the Senate
would preside over the trial and decide whether to convict. See U.S. CONST. art. II,
§ 4; art. I, §§ 2–3. The President has no role in the impeachment process. Although
the Supreme Court in United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483, 483–85 (1886), held
that Congress could limit the incidental removal power when a department head
appoints an inferior officer, the removal of the cadet-engineer in Perkins had to
proceed through a court martial, an organ of the executive branch. It is far from
clear that Congress could permit a department head to appoint and then usurp the
removal power through a statutory-impeachment process, leaving the President or
department head without any role in the sole removal process.
221
See e.g., VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 84 (ch.1, ll. 42–44) (Librairie Nizet
1959) (1759).
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the most influential court on matters of administrative law, routinely
reviewing numerous important administrative law cases, including
ALJs’ decisions. 222 The court also has a substantially lighter caseload
than all other federal circuits. 223 With the administrative assistance of
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (“AOC”), its
judges have the capacity for the administrative duty of selecting and
disciplining ALJs. The Circuit also has the added benefit of a prime
222

See, e.g., GORDON BERMANT ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., THE CASES
OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CIRCUIT 3–4 (1982) (estimating that forty-five percent of “high burden agency
cases” are filed in the D.C. Circuit); John M. Golden, The Federal Circuit and the
D.C. Circuit: Comparative Trials of Two Semi-Specialized Courts, 78 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 553, 554 (2010) (“[T]he D.C. Circuit . . . hears a disproportionate share of
the United States’ administrative law cases.”) (citing John G. Roberts, Jr., What
Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A Historical View, 92 VA. L. REV. 375, 376–77
(2006) (“One-third of the D.C. Circuit appeals are from agency decisions. That
figure is less than twenty percent nationwide.”)); Richard L. Revesz, Congressional
Influence on Judicial Behavior? An Empirical Examination of Challenges to
Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1100, 1103 n.14 (2001)
(citing Harold H. Bruff, Coordinating Judicial Review in Administrative Law, 39
UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1202 (1992); Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are
Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 621
& n.2 (1994)) (noting that D.C. Circuit decides nearly one-third of all direct
appeals from federal agencies).
223
The D.C. Circuit decided 173 cases on the merits per active judge in
2010. In comparison, the national average was 459. Relatively small circuits
decided more cases on the merits per judge: 502 for the Eighth Circuit, 415 for the
First Circuit, and 242 for the Tenth Circuit. See Federal Court Management
COURTS,
Statistics
December
2010:
Courts
of
Appeals,
U.S.
http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/cgi-bin/cmsa2010Dec.pl (last visited
Nov. 30, 2012) (select circuit for report at prompt); see also Susan Low Bloch &
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200th Anniversary of the Federal Courts of
the District of Columbia, 90 GEO. L.J. 549, 562 n.63 (2002) (referring to Jonathan
Groner, Circuit Pick Caught in the Middle: GOP Senator Questions Need to Fill
Vacancy, LEGAL TIMES, June 1, 2000, at 1); John B. Oakley, Precedent in the
Federal Courts of Appeals: An Endangered or Invasive Species, 8 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 123, 126 (2006). Indeed, the relatively light caseload may explain what
some view as the D.C. Circuit’s “unusually intrusive approach to administrative
law.” See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Comment, Legislative Reform of Judicial Review of
Agency Actions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1110, 1126 (1995). Although some have attributed
the D.C. Circuit’s smaller caseload to the complexity of its cases, see, e.g., Bruff,
supra note 222, at 1236, I am skeptical. In my admittedly anecdotal experience,
death-penalty, prisoner-rights, and habeas cases can be extremely time-consuming,
with large records and inadequate briefing. The D.C. Circuit hears few of these
cases. See U.S. COURTS, supra (select D.C. Circuit at prompt).
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location. Like numerous ALJs, most agencies, and the AOC, the D.C.
Circuit is based in D.C.
The selection process could proceed much in the same way
that it does now. ALJ candidates could continue to take the
preliminary examination that the OPM currently administers under
the D.C. Circuit’s auspices, with the AOC’s administrative
support. 224 After the examination, with the AOC’s assistance, the
D.C. Circuit could then assign each candidate a score based on his or
her examination, experience, and qualifications, much as the OPM
does now. 225 Through a notice-and-comment procedure that the
courts of appeals currently use for bankruptcy-judge candidates, 226
the court could then solicit comments on the three highest-scoring
candidates. The agency for which the ALJ would work would, like
other interested parties, be able to provide comments and indicate its
preferred candidate from one of the three candidates.
But the agency, unlike other interested parties, could also
submit its own candidate and thereby create a roster of four
candidates. 227 If the agency submits a candidate for consideration,
interested parties could then provide comments on the agency’s
submitted candidate. After considering the examination and the
received comments, the D.C. Circuit would appoint the ALJ from the
list of three or four candidates, under what I refer to as a new “Rule
of Three or Four.” Each agency would retain the authority to
determine the number of ALJs that it needs. 228

224

See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
226
See, e.g., Official Notice, Sixth Circuit Judicial Council, Office of the
Circuit
Exec.
(May
29,
2011),
available
at
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/documents/TNM_Public_Notice.pdf (request
for comment on bankruptcy-judge candidates).
227
See GAO-10-14, supra note 40, at 9–10 (stating that agencies seek
more influence over selection process, including ability to select candidates with
specialized knowledge).
228
See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2006). My proposal concerns the future
appointment of ALJs. As for current ALJs, I would suggest “grandfathering” them
into the new system by permitting the D.C. Circuit to appoint them summarily. See
35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2006) (prescribing a similar appointment process for improperly
appointed administrative patent judges). This “grandfathering” would ease the
administrative difficulties with appointing so many incumbent ALJs. But, as with
other solutions to prior improper appointments, it would not resolve whether
decisions made prior to D.C. Circuit’s appointment are valid. See id. § 6(d).
225
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Agencies, among others, could request that the D.C. Circuit
discipline or remove an ALJ for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance,” the same standard that governs bankruptcy judges229
and numerous other federal adjudicators. 230 Per statute, any agency
complaint concerning an ALJ would be placed on a “fast track” that
requires the D.C. Circuit to decide the matter within two months.
Prompt resolution would ensure that agencies are able to have
incompetent or malfeasant ALJs removed promptly. Agencies would
retain a right to suspend ALJs immediately when the agency
“considers that action necessary in the interests of national security,”
with limited judicial review. 231 Other “interested parties,” as the term
is understood under the APA (§ 554(c)), could also seek ALJs’
removal or discipline. 232 The D.C. Circuit itself would have no power
to discipline or remove an ALJ sua sponte.
By vesting the D.C. Circuit with appointment and removal
power, the D.C. Circuit would become another actor responsible for
ALJs. The D.C. Circuit would replace the MSPB’s role in removing
and disciplining ALJs and the OPM’s and agencies’ role in hiring
ALJs. Nevertheless, the OPM would continue to share
responsibilities concerning increased ALJ pay, temporary
assignments, and ensuring ALJ decisional independence. Indeed,
because the AOC, not the OPM, would assist the D.C. Circuit with
ALJ hiring, the OPM should be able to focus on ALJ performance
and decisional independence. 233
229

See 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2006).
See infra note 337 and accompanying text. Although the Court in
Bowsher v. Synar suggested that removal under this provision could permit
removal for “any number of actual or perceived transgressions,” 478 U.S. 714, 729
(1986), the Court in Free Enterprise Fund suggested, without referring to Bowsher,
that the provision for removal provided only narrow grounds for removal, see Free
Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157–58 (2010). These narrower grounds
for removal limit the discretion of the removing party—here the D.C. Circuit—and
thus limit the D.C. Circuit’s control or supervision over the ALJs.
231
See 5 U.S.C. § 7532.
232
Agencies would still decide motions for ALJ bias. See id. § 556(b). If
the court became inundated with frivolous motions from “interested parties” whom
the ALJ likely ruled against, the Court, per statute, could adopt rules that permit
single judges to decide whether a complaint is sufficiently substantial to be referred
to a panel for decision. Cf. FED. R. APP. P. 27(c) (permitting single circuit judge to
decide motions).
233
Indeed, because many of the OPM’s and MSPB’s duties would be
transferred to the AOC, federal administrative cost should remain approximately
230
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As discussed below, these changes to ALJ selection will
resolve (or at least substantially mitigate) the appointment, removal,
and impartiality concerns discussed in Part II. Moreover, to Dr.
Pangloss’s relief, this system will also provide a much better world,
if not the best possible one, for ALJs and agencies even if the
constitutional concerns above do not amount to constitutional
violations.
B. Clarifying Limits on Interbranch Appointment and Removal
As described below, the D.C. Circuit’s appointment of ALJs
is constitutional and resolves the appointment issue surrounding
ALJs. Depending on whether ALJs are inferior officers or
employees, the Appointments Clause’s text either permits my
proposed interbranch appointment or is otherwise irrelevant. The
Supreme Court has, however, limited Congress’s ability to permit the
“Courts of Law” to appoint executive-branch officers under
incongruous-appointment or separation-of-powers theories. Under
these perhaps distinct but incestuous theories, the appointment must
not improperly impede the functioning of the judicial and executive
branches. Congress can very likely satisfy the inquiry if it vests the
D.C. Circuit with the interbranch appointment of ALJs. As part of my
analysis below, I propose a three-part inquiry to simplify and clarify
the Court’s current, partially redundant, and vague incongruousappointment analysis.
1. The Appointments Clause
If ALJs are inferior officers, the Excepting Clause expressly
permits Congress, “as [it] think[s] proper,” to vest their appointment
in “Courts of Law.” 234 The D.C. Circuit is a “Court[] of Law,” 235 and

the same. See Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 42 (discussing possible increased
administrative costs that may arise from creating a new independent agency to
oversee ALJs). Likewise, the direct judicial decision concerning ALJ discipline and
removal—instead of judicial review of administrative action—should save
administrative costs.
234
U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
235
See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 888–89 (1991) (holding that
“Courts of Law” refer to legislative and Article III courts); Morrison v. Olson, 487
U.S. 654, 678–80 (1988) (assuming that Special Division, comprised of Article III
judges, was a “Court of Law”); Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 378 (1901) (holding
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thus the Clause’s text expressly permits the D.C. Circuit to appoint
ALJs.
Even if ALJs are instead employees, appointments by the
D.C. Circuit should not offend the Constitution. The Supreme Court
has been clear that the Appointments Clause does not apply to the
appointment of employees and has thus suggested that Congress has
wide latitude in deciding how employees are selected. 236 Although
Congress’s power to create interbranch-employee appointments is
unresolved and has been rarely considered, 237 Congress can likely
create such appointments, subject at most to the same separation-ofpowers concerns surrounding interbranch-officer appointments. 238
After all, even Congress’s enumerated and plenary power to create an
administrative bureaucracy does not permit Congress to act in ways
that trample upon the separation of powers. 239 Courts can respect the
that Congress could, under the Appointments Clause, vest appointment in “the
[d]istrict or [c]ircuit courts”).
236
Freytag, 501 U.S. at 880 (“If we . . . conclude that a special trial judge
is only an employee, petitioners’ challenge fails, for such ‘lesser functionaries’
need not be selected in compliance with the strict requirements of Article II.”).
237
I have uncovered only two papers that have, in limited fashion,
discussed the topic. See Richard A. Epstein, Executive Power in Political and
Corporate Contexts, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 277, 288–89 (2010); Emily E.
Eineman, Note, Congressional Criminality and Balance of Powers: Are Internal
Filter Teams Really What Our Forefathers Envisioned?, 16 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 595, 613 (2007). I have uncovered no relevant judicial decisions.
238
The fact that the Constitution provides express authority for only
interbranch appointments of inferior officers, but not employees, should not be
troubling. The Excepting Clause empowers and limits Congress. It allows Congress
to use more efficient officer-appointment mechanisms, but it requires Congress to
appoint officers in a manner expressly stated in the Appointments Clause. Compare
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 673–75, with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 133–36 (1976)
(per curiam). The Necessary and Proper Clause should provide Congress all the
authority that it needs to create interbranch-employee appointments when
establishing the administrative state. The separation of powers (but not the
Appointments Clause) provides the proper boundary for those appointments. Cf.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 135–36 (explaining that Necessary and Proper Clause does not
permit Congress to ignore other constitutional limitations). The separation-ofpowers concerns should be very similar, if not identical, for employee and inferiorofficer appointments. In both instances, Congress cannot impair the central
functioning of the judicial or executive branch by giving the former the
appointment power. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691.
239
See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3155–56 (2010)
(stating that Congress must account for presidential oversight in creating a “vast
and varied federal bureaucracy”); Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism and the Public
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separation of powers in evaluating employee-selection schemes in the
same manner as they do in assessing inferior-officer appointments—
that is, by considering the appointment method’s effect on both
judicial and executive integrity, as discussed in Part IV.B.2.
Accordingly, whether ALJs are ultimately deemed employees or
officers, Congress’s interbranch-appointment powers should be
equivalent, and the courts’ inquiry should account for the same
underlying concerns.
2. Doctrinal Incongruity Limitations
Despite the fact that the Appointments Clause does not appear
to forbid interbranch appointments, the Supreme Court has imposed
limits on their use. After a false start in the mid-1800s, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly held that Congress has substantial discretion in
creating interbranch appointments, so long as the appointment is
neither incongruous nor offensive to the separation of powers. But, as
I discuss below, this “incongruity” limitation is ill defined and
partially redundant.
In 1839, the Court in Ex Parte Hennen appeared to condemn
interbranch appointments. There, the Court upheld a district court’s
appointment of a court clerk. 240 Although the case did not involve an
interbranch appointment, the Court stated that “[t]he appointing
power . . . was no doubt intended to be exercised by the department
of the government to which the officer to be appointed most
appropriately belonged.” 241
Forty years later, the Court substantially limited Hennen’s
dictum. In Ex Parte Siebold, the Court upheld the judiciary’s
interbranch appointment of election supervisors. 242 Although the
Court referred to Hennen in observing that “[i]t is no doubt usual and
proper to vest the appointment of inferior officers in that department
Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 316 (2002) (“Congress’s powers are explicitly enumerated,
and its powers are further limited through the separation of powers into three
federal branches.”).
240
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 261–62 (1839).
241
Id. at 257–58. Professor Amar has endorsed the Ex Parte Hennen view,
arguing that if the Founders had sought to permit interbranch appointments, one
would have expected “considerably more discussion” on the topic. Akhil Reed
Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 808 (1999).
242
100 U.S. 371, 398–99 (1879).
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of the government, executive or judicial, or in that particular
executive department to which the duties of such officers appertain,”
the Court also declared that “there is no absolute requirement to this
effect in the Constitution; and, if there were, it would be difficult in
many cases to determine to which department an office properly
belonged.” 243 As a result, the locus of power to appoint inferior
officers rests “in the discretion of Congress,” 244 thereby preventing
“endless controversies.” 245
Although recognizing Congress’s interbranch-appointment
power, the Supreme Court limited that power by advancing an
ambiguous incongruity principle. The Court first noted that courts in
past cases had properly refused to issue advisory administrative
decisions concerning veterans’ benefits and claims against the U.S.
Army in Florida. 246 The Court then stated:
[I]n in the present case there is no such incongruity in
the duty required as to excuse the courts from
[appointing inferior officers]. It cannot be affirmed
that the appointment of the officers in question could,
with any greater propriety, and certainly not with
equal regard to convenience, have been assigned to
any other depositary of official power capable of
exercising it. Neither the President, nor any head of
department, could have been equally competent to the
task. 247
The Court appears to have meant that an interbranch
appointment will be proper as long as the party defending the
appointment demonstrates that the appointment would (1) not
interfere with the judicial branch’s key function to resolve cases
under Article III and (2) not rest more appropriately in the executive

243

Id. at 397; see also Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 912–14
(D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge panel) (saying in dicta that Siebold contradicts an
understanding of Hennen that proscribes interbranch appointments).
244
Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397.
245
Id.
246
Id.
247
Id.
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branch based on some function of propriety, competence, and
convenience. 248
Siebold’s ambiguity was not lost on scholars or courts. Some
observers suggested that the decision should be limited to the
appointment of congressional-election officers (over which Congress
has distinct powers under Article I) 249 or to instances in which the
President’s central powers were not at issue. 250 But others concluded
that Siebold imposed only minor constraints on interbranch
appointments. For instance, a three-judge district court stated in dicta
that the incongruity inquiry does not create “an affirmative
requirement that the duty of the officer be related to the
administration of justice. It is a negative requirement that the duty
may not have ‘such incongruity’ with the judicial function as would
void the power sought to be conferred.” 251
In Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court rejected an
incongruity-based attack but otherwise failed to clarify the doctrine’s
dimensions. 252 There, the Court upheld the ability of the Special
248

Perhaps the Court intended a narrower limiting principle. The Court
speaks of “such incongruity.” Id. To what does “such” refer? The Court had not
previously referred to “incongruity” in its preceding discussion, but it had referred
to the courts’ proper refusal to provide advisory administrative opinions to the
executive branch. Id. The Court then stated that it had a constitutional duty to
appoint inferior officers “when required thereto by law,” and that “there is no such
incongruity in the duty [to appoint.]” Id. Yet if the Court were merely suggesting
that incongruity existed only when the Court was assigned a function that the
Constitution forbade (such as providing advisory opinions), then it is unclear why
the Court went on to discuss the propriety, efficiency, and competency of the
appointment.
249
See Wiener, supra note 133, at 425–26.
250
See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev’d sub
nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (“We think it must be incongruous if
an officer of one branch is authorized to appoint an officer of another branch who
is assigned a duty central to the constitutional role of that other branch.”); cf.
Theodore Y. Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Politics and the
Tenure Powers in the Court, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1159 (1988) (contending that
Morrison rejected the understanding of the majority in In re Sealed Case).
251
Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 914 (D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge
panel). Judge Wright, in dissent, took a more expansive view of the incongruity
limitation. He disapproved of the judicial appointments of board-of-education
members because such extrajudicial activities are an “unwanted diversion from
what ought to be the judge’s exclusive focus and commitment: deciding cases.” Id.
at 923 (Wright, J., dissenting).
252
487 U.S. 654, 659–734 (1988).
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Division (a specialized Article III court comprised of Article III
judges) to appoint an independent prosecutor. 253 In doing so, the
Court held that Congress had the power to create interbranch
appointments, subject to separation-of-powers and incongruity
concerns mentioned in Siebold. 254 The Court suggested that problems
would arise if (1) “such [appointment] had the potential to impair the
constitutional functions assigned to one of the branches,” and
(2) incongruity exists between the courts’ normal functions and their
duty to appoint. 255 Under this partially redundant two-part inquiry
(because each part looks to the courts’ functioning), the interbranch
appointment of independent counsel was deemed not incongruous.
The Court had earlier permitted the courts to appoint prosecutors, 256
Congress sought to resolve “the conflicts of interest that could arise
in situations when the Executive Branch is called upon to investigate
its own high-ranking officers,” 257 and Congress had rendered the
appointing judges ineligible to participate in matters concerning the
independent counsel. 258 Of significance for present purposes, the
Court’s analysis did not stop there. It went on to reject an argument
that the entire statutory scheme, including its appointment provision,
violated the separation of powers. 259 Morrison is the Court’s last
word on interbranch appointments. 260

253

See id.
See id. at 673–76.
255
Id. at 676.
256
See id.
257
Id. at 677.
258
See id.
259
See id. at 685–96.
260
See Samahon, supra note 54, at 258–66. Professor Tuan Samahon has
argued that if the Court’s decision in Edmond v. United States overruled
Morrison’s test for determining who are inferior officers, “[i]t precludes
interbranch appointments pursuant to the Excepting Clause” because usually
officers are subordinate to those who appoint them. See id. at 267. Samahon
recognizes, however, that lower courts have continued to reconcile Edmond and
Morrison. See id. at 258–64. Moreover, lower courts since Edmond have affirmed
Congress’s power to create interbranch appointments. See United States v. Hilario,
218 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Moreau, CR 07-0388 JB, 2008
WL 4104131, at *38–39 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008).
254
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3. Refining Incongruity Limitations
To bring the Court’s interbranch-appointment-power analysis
into sharper focus, I propose ordering it into three steps. As explained
below, these steps are consistent with interbranch-appointment
decisions and combine Morrison’s overlapping separation-of-powers
and incongruity inquiries into one “incongruity analysis.” The first
step requires determining whether a significant reason for the
interbranch appointment exists. The second step considers whether
the interbranch appointment impedes the central functioning of the
appointing branch, usually the judiciary. And the third step considers
whether the appointment impedes the central function of the
competing branch, usually the executive branch.
The first step asks whether Congress has a significant
justification to create an interbranch appointment, such as
minimizing conflicts of interest in the appointment of a prosecutor to
investigate the executive branch’s high-ranking members. 261 This
justification recognizes the Court’s long-standing appreciation for
functional concerns that lead Congress to implement interbranch
appointments. 262 At the same time, this inquiry can help to ensure
that Congress is not unnecessarily deviating from the general “law or
rule” in Hennen and Siebold that Congress should vest the
appointment of an inferior officer within the “department of
government to which the official to be appointed most appropriately
belonged.” 263 For instance, Congress would not appear to have a
significant reason for permitting courts to appoint deputy agency
261

See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677. Another significant justification, as
mentioned in Ex Parte Siebold, is that difficulty of telling whether a certain inferior
officer rests within a particular branch. See Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397
(1879). But such ambiguity, while sufficient, is not necessary because federal
courts have upheld the interbranch appointments of U.S. Attorneys and
independent counsel, who are plainly executive officers.
262
See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677 (considering Congress’s interest in
intrabranch conflicts of interest); Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397 (considering
convenience of interbranch appointment and the appointing branch’s competence
to appoint).
263
Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397 (quoting Ex Parte Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
230, 258 (1839)). In a decision concerning only the separation-of-powers context
(and not appointments), the Court spoke similarly, refusing to permit “the Judicial
Branch . . . [to] be assigned [or] allowed ‘tasks that are more properly
accomplished by [other] branches.’ ” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 383
(1989).
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heads because they are policymakers for which no conflicts of
interest are readily apparent.
A significant justification, however, does not mean a
necessity. 264 Such a strict requirement would deprive Congress of the
substantial discretion it has to decide how the appointment power
should be distributed “as [it] think[s] proper” under the Excepting
Clause. 265 Indeed, if necessity were required, then the Court should
not have approved the interbranch appointments of commissioners in
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 266 prosecutors in contempt
proceedings in Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,267
or election supervisors in Siebold. 268 In short, requiring necessity
would substantially limit Congress’s discretion that the Constitution
expressly grants. Asking whether a significant reason undergirds an
interbranch appointment, along with the other two steps, should
ensure that Congress uses its interbranch-appointment-vesting
discretion thoughtfully, not as a weapon to wound one of the other
branches or to aggrandize its own power. Although the “significant
justification” inquiry admittedly suffers from indefiniteness,269
limiting acceptable justifications for interbranch appointments to
mitigating structural concerns (such as with ALJs) or ambiguities
over the branch to which an inferior officer should be assigned (such
as with federal marshals) is a reasonable place to start. A significantjustification inquiry strikes the appropriate balance of respecting

264

See Moreau, 2008 WL 4104131, at *35 (rejecting any necessity
requirement). But see Wiener, supra note 133, at 432 (suggesting that interbranch
appointment of independent counsel was permissible because “[t]he raison d’être of
the Independent Counsel was to create an officer not appointed by the executive
branch”).
265
See Moreau, 2008 WL 4104131, at *35 (highlighting Congress’s broad
direction to vest appointment power under the Excepting Clause).
266
282 U.S. 344, 354 (1931).
267
481 U.S. 787, 800 (1987).
268
Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397.
269
See generally Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional
Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297 (1997) (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court
should create a methodology to provide guidance on which purposes will be
deemed “compelling” or “important” in tiered-scrutiny analysis). I have
purposefully not used the terms “compelling,” “important,” or “legitimate” to
describe the adequate justification; the incongruity analysis might unintentionally
acquire the patina of the Court’s tiered-scrutiny, equal-protection analysis. See id.
at 306.
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Congress’s prerogative while ensuring that Congress does not abuse
its discretion. 270
The second and third steps relate to one another and ask
whether the interbranch appointment undermines the central
functioning of either the judicial or executive branches. 271 In
Morrison, the Court posed the question whether the interbranch
appointment has the “potential to impair the constitutional functions
assigned to one of the branches.” 272 This seemingly general
separation-of-powers inquiry has a specialized cast in the
interbranch-appointment context, which generally concerns the
relationship between the judicial and executive branches. 273
270

Compare United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2000) (“It
is not for the courts to determine the best or most efficient repository for a power of
appointment vis-à-vis inferior officers. . . . Congress’s choice always deserves
appreciable deference.”) (citing Siebold, 100 U.S. at 397–98), and Moreau, 2008
WL 4104131, at *37 (stating that the Constitution grants Congress “considerable
discretion”), with Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991) (suggesting that
Congress is entitled to less deference when an interbranch appointment is at issue),
and Ronald J. Krotoszynski, On the Danger of Wearing Two Hats: Mistretta and
Morrison Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 417, 421–23, 476–78 (1997)
(arguing that redistributions of powers between the judicial branch and the other
branches, as opposed to redistributions between the executive and legislative
branches, are more suspect because judges are not politically accountable).
Notably, Congress has not appeared to abuse its interbranch-appointment authority.
Congress currently permits only one interbranch appointment: the district courts’
appointment of U.S. Attorneys in very limited circumstances. See Moreau, 2008
WL 4104131, at *8 (quoting Wiener, supra note 133, at 363).
271
Many have criticized the central or “core executive” function inquiry
from Morrison. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 559–60 (1994);
Stephen L. Carter, Comment, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV.
105, 105–07 (1988). My purpose here is not to propose an inquiry that is contrary
to Supreme Court precedent; my goal is merely to refine it. Those who do not
approve of Morrison’s formulation should rest easy with its application here. The
Supreme Court has, so far, not again uttered or applied the standard, including in
Free Enterprise Fund, suggesting that the Morrison standard, if not abrogated, may
be best understood as limited to the interbranch-appointment context.
272
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 677; see also id. at 684 (asking whether the
Ethics in Government Act threatens “the ‘impartial and independent federal
adjudication of claims within the judicial power of the United States’ ” (quoting
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986))).
273
Other interbranch-appointment combinations are possible. For instance,
the judiciary appoints (and removes) Article I bankruptcy judges, who are members
of the legislative branch. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2626–27
(2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). But the interbranch nature of the appointment may
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This inquiry ensures that, even with a significant purpose, an
interbranch appointment does not impede the central functioning of
the executive or judicial branches. After all if an interbranch
appointment, whatever its purposes, greatly impedes one of the
affected branches, the appointment may be unsuitable. For instance,
after the scandal concerning the forced resignations and removals of
U.S. Attorneys during the George W. Bush Administration, 274
Congress could decide that the courts, rather than the executive
branch, would be better stewards of the appointment and removal
powers concerning these “ministers of justice.” Despite Congress’s
attempt to remedy a potentially serious structural problem,
transferring to the courts the full-time duty to appoint and remove
U.S. Attorneys would likely impede the central functioning of the
executive branch—to set prosecutorial policy throughout the
country—by hindering presidential control over an important
executive function in all districts in the United States. And the U.S.
Attorneys’ appointment and removal by the courts could impede the
central functioning of the judicial branch by bogging it down in
ongoing political battles over law-enforcement policies and
personnel. Although the existing, default appointment and removal
scheme for U.S. Attorneys may present structural challenges, an
interbranch appointment would likely be more problematic by
impeding the central functioning of two branches. In other words,
these final steps ensure that Congress doesn’t choose a cure that is
worse than the disease.
By engaging in this three-part inquiry, courts can simplify the
currently amorphous and redundant separation-of-powers and
incongruity analyses. The Court’s interbranch-appointment and
separation-of-powers analyses consider both the appointing and the
affected branches, but in confusing and redundant ways. 275 My
be less troubling because the legislature cannot appoint under the Appointments
Clause.
274
See, e.g., Dan Eggen & Paul Kane, Gonzales: “Mistakes Were Made,”
POST
(Mar.
14,
2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpWASH.
dyn/content/article/2007/03/13/AR2007031300776 _pf.html.
275
See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 676. The Court’s separation of powers
inquiry is at least partially redundant with the interbranch-appointment inquiry. The
latter considers the effect of the appointment on both the appointing and
nonappointing branches, and the former considers the effect of an appointment on
either the nonappointing branch or both the nonappointing and appointing
branches. Compare Morrison, 487 U.S. at 675 (referring to separation of powers as
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proposed three-part inquiry, following recent lower-court opinions,
avoids these problems by considering the effect on both branches as
part of a compressed incongruity analysis. 276
C. Propriety of Interbranch Appointments of ALJs
Interbranch appointments of ALJs should be deemed proper
under the refined incongruity limits. Not only does a significant
reason for the interbranch appointment of ALJs exist, but the D.C.
Circuit’s appointments of them will not impede the central
functioning of either the judiciary or the executive branch.
1. Significant Purpose for Interbranch Appointment of ALJs
As to the first of the three inquiries, a significant justification
supports the interbranch appointment of ALJs: the resolution or
mitigation of the ALJ separation-of-powers quandary. Vesting the
D.C. Circuit with the power to appoint ALJs remedies the existing
Appointments Clause problem by channeling ALJ appointments, in
keeping with its text, to “Courts of Law.” 277 And an interbranch
appointment remedies, in perhaps an unconventional way, the
existing concerns as to the proper balance of executive supervision
and ALJ impartiality.

an “addition[al]” issue to incongruity and suggesting that separation of powers
focuses only on the nonappointing branch), with Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 385, 389 (1989) (considering both the affected branch and the appointing
branch for its separation-of-powers analysis). Thus, under either separation-ofpowers formulation, the two inquiries overlap at least in part. See Wiener, supra
note 133, at 436 & n.338; see also United States v. Moreau, No. CR 07-0388, 2008
WL 4104131, at *17 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008).
276
See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 26–29 (1st Cir. 2000)
(rejecting challenge to judicial appointment of U.S. Attorneys in a combined
incongruity and separation-of-powers analysis); see also In re Sealed Case, 838
F.2d 476, 533 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (Ginsburg, R.B., J., dissenting), rev’d sub nom.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (“An inter-branch appointment would
indeed fail the test of congruity if it violated the separation of powers doctrine.”).
277
Resolving an appointments concern alone is not a significant reason for
an interbranch appointment. Were it otherwise, Congress’s power to create
interbranch appointments would be essentially unlimited.
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a. Mitigating Presidential-Control Concerns
With the appointment power in the D.C. Circuit’s hands, the
President loses any constitutional power he may have had to remove
ALJs. This counterintuitive effect arises because the power to remove
is incident to the power to appoint, unless Congress has placed the
removal power elsewhere. 278 Courts have consistently applied this
principle in the intrabranch-appointment context, albeit without
significant discussion of the interbranch nature of the appointment
and principally in the context of interbranch appointments of Article I
or Article IV inferior officers. 279 And, indeed, the judiciary currently
has the incidental, interbranch-removal power over Article I
bankruptcy judges. 280 To be sure, in the context of judicial
interbranch appointments of Article II inferior officers, courts have
stressed the executive branch’s ability to remove prosecutors whom
courts had appointed. 281 But courts have never held that the executive
branch must have the power to remove those officials, much less

278

See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161 (2010);
Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 515 (1920) (“The power to remove is, in the
absence of statutory provision to the contrary, an incident of the power to
appoint.”); In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 259–60 (1839) (noting that officers
serve at the discretion of the appointing power).
279
See Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419, 424 (1901) (considering
commissioners (i.e., justices of the peace in Indian Territory) appointed by judges);
Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902, 913 n.13 (D.D.C. 1967) (citing In re Hennen,
38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230, 257–58 (1839)) (considering appointment of D.C. schoolboard members); cf. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 354 &
n.2 (1931) (upholding interbranch appointment of commissioners, with mostly
judicial and some executive functions, and indicating that they were subordinate to
appointing judges). The court likewise suggested the same incidental removal
power exists with the appointment of executive-branch inferior officers, such as
perhaps ALJs. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 126 (1926) (“[T]he power of
appointment to executive office carries with it, as a necessary incident, the power of
removal.” (emphasis added)); see id. at 161 (same for “inferior executive officers”).
280
See 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2006). To be precise, Congress has authorized
the Judicial Councils—composed of Article III district and circuit judges—within
each circuit to remove bankruptcy judges. The circuit courts themselves have only
the appointment power under § 152.
281
See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 682–83 (1988) (deciding
whether judicial power to remove an executive officer infringed upon the executive
branch); Hilario, 218 F.3d at 27 (noting judges cannot remove interim United
States Attorneys they appoint); United States v. Moreau, CR 07-0388, 2008 WL
4104131, at *38–39 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008) (same).
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have the same kind of supervisory power over officials who exercise
only impartial, adjudicatory powers. 282
Nor should courts impose any such limit by relying on Free
Enterprise Fund. If the President or agency head permissibly lacks
removal power, Free Enterprise Fund’s ambiguous limitation on
tiered-tenure protections becomes inapposite by its own terms. That
decision invalidated one of two tenure protections that limited the
executive branch’s implied removal power. Here, only one tier of
tenure protection exists between the D.C. Circuit and ALJs, leaving
the President no implied removal power. Thus Free Enterprise’s
holding does not apply. Vesting the removal power within the D.C.
Circuit is a constitutional means of avoiding Free Enterprise Fund’s
holding that applies to tiered-tenure protections within the executive
branch. 283
Even if Free Enterprise Fund is understood to stand more
broadly for strongly endorsing or generally requiring the President’s
power to remove executive officers, the rationale in Free Enterprise
Fund does not extend to ALJs. The Court stated that the removal
282

Although Morrison relied upon the Attorney General’s “most
important[]” removal authority over independent counsel, see 487 U.S. at 696, the
Court never said that such power was required. Professor Krent argues that
Morrison determined that “some form of removal authority was constitutionally
required.” Harold J. Krent, Federal Power, Non-Federal Actors: The Ramifications
of Free Enterprise Fund, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425, 2436 (2011) (referring to
Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695–96). His inference is reasonable but not compelled. In
light of the Court’s consistent treatment of the removal power as incident to the
appointment power and the meaningfully different functions of various inferior
officers, a more limited interpretation of Morrison makes more sense if, as I
attempt to do here, one seeks to reconcile the Court’s Appointments Clause
jurisprudence.
283
ALJs do not morph into principal officers if the D.C. Circuit, as
opposed to an agency head, can remove them. The Court in Edmond v. United
States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997), said, “ ‘[I]nferior officers’ are officers whose
work is directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by
Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate.” The judges of
the D.C. Circuit, who received presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation,
can remove ALJs under limited circumstances. And agency heads, who (in
probably every case) were also similarly nominated and confirmed, can reverse
ALJs’ decisions as to fact and law. Cf. Amar, supra note 241, at 807 (contending
that subordination, not removability, is the relevant inquiry for inferior-officer
status). The court’s significant, but limited, removal power and agency heads’
substantial supervision over ALJ decisionmaking would render ALJs no more than
inferior officers.
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power ensures that the President has the power to supervise unelected
subordinates, not merely to persuade them “to do what they ought to
do without persuasion.” 284 But, when the government is a party to
what is meant to be an impartial formal proceeding, the ALJ, as an
impartial decisionmaker, should not decide in the government’s favor
unless the government persuades it to do so. A contrary result—that
the President can obtain a desired result from an ALJ without
persuasion—would lead to significant due process concerns and
undermine the very purpose of ALJs. In fact, the Court in Wiener v.
United States upheld implicit limits on the President’s removal power
over adjudicators by relying on Congress’s ability to render
adjudicators “entirely free from the control or coercive influence,
direct or indirect” 285 and, as the Court said that it took for granted,
the President’s inability to interfere with any specific adjudication.286
In short, although the President may not have to persuade an agency
to implement a certain policy, he (or an agency) must do just that—
under the APA and under the U.S. Constitution—during formal
administrative adjudication. The Court’s doctrine supports this
normative view grounded in due process. Whereas removal may be a
necessary tool for presidential supervision over policymakers, 287 it
should not be necessary for presidential supervision of impartial
adjudicators appointed by another branch. 288
Finally, the lack of one form of presidential control—the
removal power—should not be troubling, given the other forms of

284

Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3157 (2010).
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1958) (quoting
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)).
286
Id. at 356.
287
See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3159 (“The Commission cannot
wield a free hand to supervise individual members if it must destroy the Board in
order to fix it.”).
288
But see Jeffrey A. Wertkin, A Return to First Principles: Rethinking
ALJ Compromises, 22 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 365, 401 (2002) (stating
prior to Free Enterprise Fund that “after-the-fact correction of a single decision
supplies insufficient control”). I distinguish between those that perform only
adjudicative functions, such as ALJs, and those who sometimes (or, at least, are
permitted to) promulgate rules, such as agency heads. An interbranch appointment
and an incidental removal of policymakers create more troubling separation-ofpowers concerns for both the executive and judicial branches. See infra Part IV.D–
E.
285
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executive supervision and direction. 289 The executive branch, after
all, retains a prominent place in the removal decisionmaking process
because agencies can initiate ALJ-removal proceedings. Thus, unlike
the proposal that granted ALJs Article III protections, my proposal
does not suffer the infirmity of completely denuding the executive
branch from the removal of an executive officer. As explained in Part
IV.E, the President retains tools aside from initiating removal
proceedings to have sufficient supervisory authority over ALJs’
policy decisions. 290
b. Mitigating Impartiality Concerns
Judicial appointment and removal cures or mitigates the ALJ
impartiality concerns, including the concerns that arise from
Caperton. Because the agency is no longer “choos[ing] the judge in
[its] own cause,” 291 any “probability of unfairness” 292 or
“unconstitutional ‘potential for bias’ ” should not exist under
Caperton’s standard. 293 The D.C. Circuit can also help ensure that the
289

Professor Jonathan Entin has concluded that the removal power has
limited actual significance, but its rhetoric and the Court’s holdings have
significant symbolic consequences. Jonathan L. Entin, Synecdoche and the
Presidency: The Removal Power as Symbol, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1595, 1602–
03 (1997). Perhaps, then, the Court’s formal focus on the removal power, as
opposed to other forms of administrative control or independence, has assumed
inflated importance. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding
Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 30 (2010) (arguing that
scholars should focus on practical limitations on agency independence). A
functional approach to executive control that looks beyond the removal power
makes the most sense in cases, such as with ALJs, where the removal power creates
other constitutional tensions.
290
My proposal may not satisfy unitary executive theorists because the
President cannot remove ALJs. But those theorists’ dissatisfaction would transcend
my particular proposal and extend to the Court’s removal-powers doctrine and any
limits arising from due process. This doctrine has already tacitly approved of the
interbranch-removal power, see supra note 279, and significantly limited
presidential removal power, see generally Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3138.
My purpose here is to provide a workable solution that accounts for both normative
and doctrinal problems, not to challenge or provide a new normative theory of the
President’s supervisory powers.
291
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 886 (2009).
292
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (quoting In re Murchison,
349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
293
Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881 (quoting Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400
U.S. 455, 465–66 (1971)).
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ALJs have a broad array of experiences within and outside the
agency and thereby reduce the likelihood that ALJs come from the
farm team that is the agency’s enforcement division with undue
sympathy for agency-enforcement, especially highly partisan policy,
positions. The D.C. Circuit, with careful consideration of an agency’s
needs, will likely be more concerned than a selecting agency with
indicia of a candidate’s impartiality. As with the transfer of removal
power to the D.C. Circuit, the transfer of appointing power enhances,
at the very least, the perception of fairness. And, as Caperton makes
clear, perceptions concerning impartiality matter. 294
Likewise, by placing the removal decision in another branch,
those appearing before ALJs will feel more confident that the
executive branch—whether in the form of the President, the agency,
or any other executive actor—is not directing the actions of a
marionette ALJ, especially in cases in which credibility is key and an
ALJ’s decision receives increased deference. 295 That the President’s
and agency’s actual removal power is currently very limited is
largely beside the point. The perception that the President and agency
have more control over ALJs than impartial courts is a powerful
force that creates the appearance of unfairness that appears to drive,
as Caperton makes clear, the Supreme Court’s due process inquiry.
Vesting the removal power in the D.C. Circuit largely mitigates the
appearance of improper agency control over ALJs. 296
In short, an interbranch-appointment mechanism serves a
significant purpose: it resolves, or at least substantially mitigates, the
appointment, removal, and impartiality concerns that now surround
ALJs. And it does so better than other appointment solutions under
the Excepting Clause by way of a simple transfer of duties. For
instance, if the President alone or a nonindependent executive
department appointed and removed ALJs, the ALJ would have only
one tier of tenure protection, and that good cause tenure protection
294

See id. at 888–89 (noting that state recusal requirements for appearance
of impropriety will limit due process challenges).
295
See Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 29–33 (explaining agency’s
deference to ALJ credibility determinations); Timony, supra note 2, at 811–12 &
nn.28–29 (same); supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text (same).
296
This Article does not consider whether, aside from impartiality, the
ability of the executive branch to overrule an ALJ decision creates a due process
problem. The Supreme Court’s decision in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 496 (1951) (instructing lower courts to defer to agency, as opposed to
ALJ, decisions), strongly suggests not.
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would provide the removing executive party with significant
discretion. 297 Vesting the same powers in a new or current
independent department (whose members, because of their
independence, the President could remove only for cause) would
then, as now, leave the President’s removal power in jeopardy
because two tiers of tenure protection would exist between the
President and the ALJs. The competing concerns underlying ALJs’
place in the federal bureaucracy render an interbranch appointment
appropriate and demonstrate that the executive branch is not an
equally, much less a more, appropriate repository of the appointment
(and thus the incidental removal) power. 298
2. Judicious Appointments
Congress can use an interbranch appointment to end ALJs’
separation-of-powers quandary without impeding the central
functioning of the judicial branch. Article II expressly gives the
courts of law, if they have Congress’s blessing, the power to appoint
inferior officers. 299 The courts routinely appoint officials with solely
adjudicatory powers—magistrate judges, special masters, and
bankruptcy judges, for instance. 300 Indeed, the courts of appeals
themselves appoint (and have the power to remove) bankruptcy
judges for their respective circuits, and this appointment qualifies as
297

The default appointment mechanism of nomination and confirmation
would likely provide ALJs additional authority within the federal bureaucracy. See
Nina A. Mendelson, Another Word on the President’s Statutory Authority Over
Agency Action, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2455, 2478 (2011) (emphasizing the
importance of Senate-confirmed appointments to agency authority). But such an
appointment for ALJs would leave the removal power with the President, see
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 119, 162 (1926) (recognizing the President’s
incidental removal power), and thus not eradicate impartiality concerns. Thus, even
if Congress could only use an interbranch appointment when a default appointment
was less suitable, an interbranch appointment for ALJs would be permissible
because it provides a more comprehensive remedy for concerns surrounding ALJs.
Moreover, traditional appointment of sixteen hundred ALJs would be an onerous
mode of appointment.
298
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 383 (1989) (explaining
that the court should not perform tasks better suited to other branches); Ex Parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397 (1879) (explaining the court’s appointment power
under Article II).
299
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
300
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 152, 631 (2006) (authorizing court appointment of
bankruptcy and magistrate judges, respectively).
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interbranch because bankruptcy judges are Article I judges. 301 ALJs
also adjudicate, albeit in cases in which their decisions advance the
policies of an agency, as opposed to those of Congress, the federal
common law, or the Constitution.302 Accordingly, granting the D.C.
Circuit power to appoint adjudicators generally, by itself, almost
certainly does not impede the central functioning of the judicial
branch—that is, to decide disputes.
ALJs’ status as executive, as opposed to judicial, officers
does not alter this conclusion. The Supreme Court has never
invalidated an interbranch appointment; therefore, which
appointments are inappropriate is generally unknown. But one
recognized possibility is that an interbranch appointment is
inappropriate when it “thrust[s] courts into partisan, political
battles.” 303 Whatever fears may exist when the judiciary appoints
independent counsel, interim U.S. Attorneys, or other executive
inferior officers should be absent for judicial appointment of ALJs.
ALJs are meant to be neutrals who do not create or advocate
particular policies, much less those identified with certain political
parties. Indeed, if ALJ selection is currently partisan, vesting the
appointment power in the D.C. Circuit should mitigate the
partisanship because the D.C. Circuit, like other courts, routinely
selects impartial adjudicators from a candidate pool. Because
agencies themselves continue to have the power to set policy, the
courts would not select policymakers. Instead, they would appoint
those who have a duty to find facts and apply the agency’s
regulations and organic acts to disputes before them. This is, at the
301

See 28 U.S.C. § 152 (conferring authority on U.S. courts of appeals to
appoint bankruptcy judges); Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011)
(holding that bankruptcy courts are not “adjuncts of Article III courts”); id. at 2624
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (same).
302
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513–14 (1978) (stating that ALJs
were “functionally comparable” to judges); Moliterno, supra note 60, at 1209
(noting that ALJs do not overrule the actions of the two elected branches).
303
Wiener, supra note 133, at 426; see Amar, supra note 241, at 809
(arguing that appointment of independent counsel “risks politicizing the
judiciary”); Wiener, supra note 133, at 430–31 (arguing against the judicial
appointment of U.S. Attorneys for this reason). But compare Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989) (“We do not believe . . . that the significantly
political nature of the [U.S. Sentencing] Commission’s work renders
unconstitutional its placement within the Judicial Branch.”), with id. at 396 (“Nor
do the [Sentencing] Guidelines . . . involve a degree of political authority
inappropriate for a nonpolitical Branch.”).
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very least, a quasi-judicial function that judges understand and can
determine with no less competence than agencies. 304
The D.C. Circuit’s ability to receive comments from
interested parties helps assuage fears of partisanship and inadequate
information. 305 Controversy arose when a judge on the Special
Division discussed who should serve as independent counsel in the
Whitewater Matter with Republican senators. 306 As Professor Ronald
Krotoszynski has suggested, a public notice-and-comment period
would allow judges to obtain advice from numerous interested parties
without resorting to ex parte contacts that could easily create the
appearance of partisan appointments. 307 These comments would be
much like amicus briefs with which the D.C. Circuit is all too
familiar. Receiving comments—publicly filed briefs, of sorts, from
interested persons—helps “maintain[] the dignity of Article III
courts” 308 by allowing them to decide in a manner that is both
familiar and transparent.
Likewise, ALJs’ status as executive officers does not
meaningfully distinguish them from the other adjudicators (i.e.,
bankruptcy judges and magistrate judges) whom appellate courts
currently appoint for purposes of the Exceptions Clause. Bankruptcy
judges are Article I judges, and magistrates are Article III inferior
officers. Unlike ALJs, who are executive officers, these other
adjudicators cannot be reversed by the executive branch. But the
executive branch’s ability to reverse an ALJ’s decision should not be
troubling because that branch has the same or greater power over
other executive officials occasionally appointed by the judiciary
(such as U.S. Attorneys).
304

See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396 (“This is not a case in which
judges are given power . . . in an area in which they have no special knowledge or
expertise.” (quoting Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 676 n.13 (1988) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
305
See Amar, supra note 241, at 809 (“Judges will not be good at picking
prosecutors because they have inadequate information and weak incentives.”);
Krent & DuVall, supra note 55, at 42 (arguing that those outside of an ALJ’s
agency lack familiarity with that agency’s “law”).
306
See, e.g., Amar, supra note 241, at 809 (mentioning the “partisan
bickering” resulting from the judge’s meeting); Krotoszynski, supra note 270, at
447–55 (discussing Starr’s appointment and subsequent challenge to Judge
Sentelle’s ex parte meeting).
307
Krotoszynski, supra note 270, at 474.
308
Id. at 475.
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The fact that ALJs, even if executive officers, are not also
officers of an Article III court is relevant, but not dispositive. Courts
have found it relevant, for instance, that prosecutors are not only
executive officers, but also officers of the court. 309 Yet, ALJs’ lack of
a dual-officer capacity does not mean that interbranch appointment of
ALJs is improper. Unlike prosecutors, who exercise purely executive
functions (even when serving as officers of the court), ALJs exercise
only adjudicative functions, and the courts routinely review their
decisions. Courts’ and ALJs’ shared function gives the former the
competence to appoint the latter. In other words, the ALJs’ similar
function to courts more than compensates for ALJs’ lack of dualofficer status within two branches.
Perhaps, however, appointing a large cadre of ALJs would
require the D.C. Circuit to forsake its central function of deciding
cases. After all, the appointment of an independent counsel, election
supervisors, U.S. Attorneys, or even bankruptcy judges is a relatively
rare event. 310 In contrast, the federal administrative state has more
than sixteen hundred ALJs. The large number of ALJs (almost
double the 874 Article III judgeships 311) creates the possibility that
appointing ALJs, not deciding cases, will become a full-time job for
the D.C. Circuit judges.
Yet, Congress can mollify this legitimate concern. The
average annual number of ALJ appointments will likely rest around
fifty-six, 312 certainly more than other interbranch appointments, but
309

See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2000)
(describing dual role of U.S. Attorneys as officers of the court); cf. Ex Parte
Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 397 (1879) (describing dual role of federal marshals). But
see United States v. Moreau, No. CR 07-0388 JB, 2008 WL 4104131, at *38
(D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008) (“[An appointed U.S. Attorney] is not part of the judiciary,
nor has he ever been.”).
310
For instance, the D.C. Circuit is charged with appointing only one
bankruptcy judge to a fourteen-year term. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1)–(2) (2006). Even
the elephantine Ninth Circuit must appoint only sixty-eight bankruptcy judges to
fourteen-year terms. See id. (listing the number of judges each individual district
must appoint). And the district courts can appoint a U.S. Attorney only if politicalappointment mechanisms have failed. See Wiener, supra note 133, at 366
(explaining the appointment process).
311
See
Federal
Judgeships,
U.S.
COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/
FederalJudgeships.aspx
(last
visited Jan. 23, 2013) (listing 874 total Article III judgeships).
312
Although I was unable to find any statistics concerning the average
ALJ tenure, the GAO has reported that “the ALJ program has experienced a low
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still a manageable number. Congress can largely mitigate any burden
on the D.C. Circuit by permitting it to appoint ALJs in three-judge
panels. 313 Assuming that the Court has nine active judges (and may
have up to eleven active judges), 314 the Court could establish at least
three panels for each year, with each panel appointing approximately
nineteen ALJs per year (or fewer if senior judges are permitted and
willing to assist their active colleagues on additional panels). 315 If
each appointment is treated like a decision on the merits by each
judge on the panel (meaning that each appointment is weighed more
heavily than decisions on the merits because each appointment
“counts” three times, one for each judge), participating in nineteen
appointment decisions increases each active D.C. Circuit judge’s
judge-to-merits-decision ratio, based on data from 2010, from 1:173
to 1:192. This ratio is still significantly below the same ratio for other
courts with relatively light caseloads (e.g., 1:242 for the Tenth
Circuit, 1:293 for the Sixth Circuit, 1:319 for the Seventh Circuit, and
1:415 for the First Circuit) and the national ratio of 1:459. 316 Because

annual retirement rate, ranging from 2 to 5 percent from 2002 through 2006.”
GAO-10-14, supra note 40, at 13. For ease of discussion, I have estimated a
retirement rate of 3.5 percent and applied that to the number of ALJs provided in
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Free Enterprise Fund, rounded up to the nearest
hundred (sixteen hundred). See Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3213
app. C (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“According to data provided by the Office of
Personnel Management, reprinted below, there are 1,584 administrative law judges
(ALJs) in the Federal Government.”).
313
Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b) (permitting three-judge panels to decide cases).
314
28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (permitting eleven judges on the D.C. Circuit). For
ease of discussion, I rely on the assumption that the D.C. Circuit will have at least
nine active judges because the D.C. Circuit had nine judges during the time period
relevant for the data underlying the 2010 judge-to-decision ratio.
315
The D.C. Circuit has several senior judges. See U.S. COURT OF
APPEALS: D.C. CIRCUIT, http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/ (last visited Jan. 23, 2013)
(click on “Judges” tab to see listing of judges). If three agreed to assist with ALJ
appointments and thereby create a fourth panel, each panel would appoint
approximately fourteen ALJs per year.
316
See supra note 223 (documenting the caseloads of the U.S. Courts of
Appeals). The AOC has released similar data from 2011, but this more recent data
does not vary materially from the 2010 data and thus does not alter my conclusions
above. U.S. Court of Appeals—Judicial Caseload Profile, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/
FederalCourtManagementStatistics/2011/Appeals_FCMS_Profiles_December_201
1.pdf&page=3 (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). For instance, although the 2011 relevant
ratio for the D.C. Circuit increases from 1:173 to 1:203 (based largely on the court
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the D.C. Circuit would continue to have the lightest caseload of all
federal circuits even when appointing ALJs, any argument that the
appointing of ALJs will improperly burden the D.C. Circuit “from
accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions” 317 is difficult
to accept.
Even if one disagrees with my educated guess over the
number of appointments or its burden on the D.C. Circuit, other
remedies exist for managing the number of appointments. Perhaps if
ALJs reduce their average tenure or if agencies need a greater
number of ALJs, my suggested average annual number of fifty-six
ALJ appointments may be too low. Or appointing ALJs may be
unduly burdensome merely because appointing would now
potentially constitute approximately eleven percent of each active
D.C. Circuit judge’s duties or because the D.C. Circuit’s docket is
more time consuming and complex than I expect. If these objections
turn out to be well founded, relatively simple solutions exist.
Congress could allow three-judge panels within all of the federal
circuit courts to appoint ALJs and rotate the appointing duty among
the active judges of the circuits in random order, based on either each
circuit’s caseload or the number of ALJs working within each circuit,
as determined by the AOC. Although I have proposed turning to the
D.C. Circuit based on its administrative law expertise, its location,
and its light caseload, diluting the appointing burden throughout all
of the federal circuit courts is another way of achieving the benefits
of an interbranch appointment without improperly impeding the D.C.
Circuit or other “Court of Law’s” judicial function. 318

having one fewer judge), the national ratio increases by an even greater degree
from 1:459 to 1:496.
317
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 396 (1989) (quoting Nixon v.
Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977)). Similarly, the AOC’s assistance
to the D.C. Circuit should not be problematic. The Supreme Court has already
indicated its support of the AOC’s existence and “myriad responsibilities.” Id. at
388–89. Indeed, the AOC’s duties in administering the ALJ examination,
compiling the agency and third-party comments, and otherwise assisting the D.C.
Circuit ensure that the judges’ appointing of ALJs does not interfere with their
central function of deciding cases.
318
The appointing judges are not likely to identify themselves as managers
or employers, as opposed to adjudicators (and thereby undermine their judicial
function). No such identification has been alleged to occur, despite judicial
appointment of numerous other officials, including prosecutors, public defenders,
bankruptcy judges, magistrate judges, mediators, and various clerks of court.
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Finally, that the D.C. Circuit may review the decisions from
ALJs that they have appointed is a virtue, not a vice. Some litigants
and scholars have argued that an interbranch appointment is improper
when a court sits in judgment of decisions by those it appoints, such
as prosecutors. The appointment becomes improper, the argument
goes, because the judiciary forsakes its appearance of impartiality.319
But this argument proves too much. Judges decide or review cases in
which they have selected, for instance, defense counsel for the
indigent, bankruptcy judges, magistrates, and special masters (all of
whom could be the judges’ former law clerks) without impugning
their impartiality. 320 Therefore, it is difficult to see why their review
of a decision by an ALJ—chosen for his or her ability to be impartial,
not for particular policy preferences that the agency can reverse—
would be problematic, especially when the APA requires the court to
review the decision of the agency, not the ALJ. 321 Indeed, the D.C.
Circuit’s awareness that it may have to review decisions from the
ALJ may help provide the D.C. Circuit incentive to appoint the best
candidates. 322

319

See United States v. Hilario, 218 F.3d 19, 28–29 (1st Cir. 2000)
(conceding judicial appointment of prosecutors could adversely affect the court’s
impartiality); United States v. Moreau, No. CR 07-0388 JB, 2008 WL 4104131, at
*38 (D.N.M. Apr. 3, 2008) (examining possibility that such appointments could
diminish the integrity of the courts); Wiener, supra note 133, at 431–32 (arguing
judges lack impartiality and the prosecutors they appoint lack accountability). The
Morrison Court also noted that the Special Division’s members lacked the ability to
participate in any proceedings concerning the independent counsel that they had
nominated. 487 U.S. 654, 683–84 (1988). But ALJs’ limited ability to make final
policy determinations, nonpolitical role, and independence from the judiciary
(which cannot set its jurisdiction or refer matters to the ALJ, as in Morrison)
should mitigate any concern that may arise from the D.C. Circuit’s review of ALJ
decisions.
320
See, e.g., Hilario, 218 F.3d at 29 (referring to appointment of defense
counsel).
321
5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006).
322
See Amar, supra note 241, at 809 (arguing that judges lack incentive to
make excellent interbranch appointments). Admittedly, the possibility of the D.C.
Circuit reviewing a particular ALJ’s decision is slight; the other circuits review
numerous administrative orders. Yet, the D.C. Circuit is likely to be sufficiently
considerate to its sister courts to try to appoint impartial, well-trained ALJs.
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3. Improved Functioning of the Executive Branch
Despite the executive branch’s loss of power to appoint and
remove ALJs, interbranch appointment and removal do not impede
that branch’s central functioning. 323 First and foremost, agency heads
continue to have the power to reverse an ALJ decision under the
APA and thus control federal administrative policy. 324 Agencies, too,
continue to have discretion over matters concerning ALJs under my
proposal. For instance, not only do they continue to decide the
number of ALJs needed to carry out agency missions, 325 but they also
can comment on ALJ candidates and submit their own candidates for
judicial consideration. 326 Indeed, the proposed “Rule of Three or
Four,” unlike the current “Rule of Three,” acts as a suitable substitute
for selective certification by permitting the agency to ensure,
especially if the “Veterans’ Preference” leads to three candidates
without sufficient expertise, that at least one candidate has certain
323

See In re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476, 494–95 (D.C. Cir. 1988), rev’d
sub nom. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (asking whether appointment
undermines the President’s ability to make policy choices); see also Blumoff, supra
note 250, at 1160–61:
The requirement of some congruity also undermined the Sealed
Case court’s ‘Chicken Little’ concern [that a limited incongruity
principle would essentially permit the court to appoint all inferior
officers if Congress sought to impede the executive’s
prerogative] . . . . The Supreme Court noted that Congress could
make no such delegation when the courts lacked special
competence of the subject matter.
324

5 U.S.C. § 557(b); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,
495 (1951). The Supreme Court in Bowsher stated that “[o]nce an officer is
appointed, it is only the authority that can remove him . . . that he must fear and, in
the performance of his functions, obey.” Bowsher v. United States, 478 U.S. 714,
726 (1986). This formulation is not entirely accurate in the interbranch-removal
context of ALJs. ALJs will fear the D.C. Circuit judges, who can remove them
under a heightened tenure-protection provision. But they must obey agency policies
and general conceptions of impartial adjudication. Their refusal to do so would be
relevant to any removal decision.
325
See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (empowering agencies to appoint as many ALJs as
necessary); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (considering
Special Division’s inability to name independent counsel without AG’s request
when approving of interbranch appointment of independent counsel).
326
See supra Part IV.A (outlining the agency’s participation in selecting
ALJs under this proposal).
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necessary experience. 327 Agencies may also seek the nearly
immediate removal of an ALJ, on a “fast track,” if the agency can
establish “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance.” 328 And
agencies can immediately remove an ALJ who presents a nationalsecurity risk. 329 Such abilities provide ample agency supervision over
ALJs and the smooth functioning of the executive branch.
The transferred removal power from the executive branch to
the D.C. Circuit—and thus the limited sharing of ALJ supervision
between the two branches—should not trouble the executive branch
because it has, as a practical matter, lost nothing. Its removal powers
were already substantially limited. Currently, agencies cannot simply
remove an ALJ. Instead, they must persuade an independent agency
(the MSPB) to remove an ALJ. 330 Likewise, under my proposal, the
agency must continue to persuade an independent entity to remove an
ALJ. Under both the current and the proposed removal schemes, the
President and the agency lack the ability to decide the removal
question and the ability to influence the MSPB’s or the D.C. Circuit’s
decision directly because of each body’s protection from removal.331
Both scenarios also provide ALJs a judicial forum. Although the
current scenario provides deferential judicial review of the MSPB’s
decision in the Federal Circuit, 332 my proposal permits the agency to
have speedier resolution of removal disputes because the D.C. Circuit
decides the issue in the first instance. Moreover, even if the ALJs, as
327

See supra note 29 and accompanying text (explaining the “Veteran’s
Preference” in ALJ qualification and related expertise problems under the current
system).
328
See supra note 229 and accompanying text (explaining the standard of
removal for ALJs); infra note 337 and accompanying text (same).
329
See supra note 231 and accompanying text (explaining immediate
removal option).
330
5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (establishing that removal of an ALJ is permissible
“only for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection
Board”); id. § 1202(d) (shielding members of the MSPB from the President’s atwill removal).
331
Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3171 (2010) (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (discussing the analogous inability of the President to remove
members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board directly where the
removal decision was vested in SEC commissioners who were themselves
removable only for cause).
332
See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 387 nn.33 & 35 (1983) (citing 5
U.S.C. § 7703) (highlighting that “the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from the MSPB”).
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the lower-level officers in their tiered-tenure scheme, lost their tenure
protection under a Free Enterprise Fund analysis, 333 the MSPB
would continue to have substantial tenure protection that would
prevent direct presidential interference with the MSPB’s decision. At
bottom, agencies would simply petition a different, albeit perhaps
more, independent body under my proposal.
But at the same time, the proposed tenure-protection standard
for ALJs seeks to strike the proper balance between ALJ impartiality
and executive supervision. Although Congress intended to ensure
ALJ impartiality with good cause tenure protection, 334 the good cause
standard has consistently been interpreted to permit removal of other
federal officials based on insubordination.335 Such a standard
suggests, contrary to congressional intent, that ALJs are required to
follow agency heads’ direction on how to decide matters. Were it
otherwise, the term “insubordination” would assume a different
meaning for ALJs than for other federal officials, without any textual
support for the distinction. 336 The proposed “inefficiency, neglect of
duty, and malfeasance” standard—the ubiquitous protection for
federal adjudicators 337—provides more specific grounds for removal
than the good cause standard and thereby further constrains the
333

Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3164 (declaring unconstitutional the
two tiers of tenure protection for PCAOB members).
334
See Ramspeck v. Fed. Trial Exam’rs Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 131–
32, 142 (1953) (“Examiners shall be removable by the agency in which they are
employed only for good cause established and determined by the Civil Service
Commission (hereinafter called the Commission) after opportunity for hearing and
upon the record thereof.”).
335
See Nagel v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 707 F.2d 1384, 1387
(Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Boyle v. United States, 515 F.2d 1397, 1402 (Ct. Cl. 1975);
Burton v. United States, 404 F.2d 365 (Ct. Cl. 1968)); see also May v. U.S. Civil
Serv. Comm’n, 230 F. Supp. 659, 661 (W.D. La. 1963).
336
See Soc. Sec. Admin. v. Goodman, 19 M.S.P.R. 321, 330–31 & n.11
(1984) (suggesting that insubordination was a proper ground for removal of ALJs,
but also suggesting that removal based on substantive decisions was improper);
Barnett, supra note 117, at 1397–98 n.231. Perhaps an ALJ is charged with being
impartial and thus cannot be insubordinate for failing to defer to the agency’s
wishes. But even so, the vague good cause standard provides the agency much
discretion in finding other more palatable, if insincere, grounds for removal.
337
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 1202(d) (MSPB members); 10 U.S.C. § 942(c)
(2006) (similar standard for judges on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces); 26 U.S.C. § 7443(f) (2006) (similar standard for tax-court judges); 28
U.S.C. § 152(e) (2006) (similar standard for bankruptcy judges); 28 U.S.C. § 631
(similar standard for magistrate judges).
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removing party’s discretion. 338 This proposed standard would not
permit removal based on insubordination. 339 But, happily for the
executive branch, it makes clear that inefficiency is a proper ground
for removal that, with proper judicial interpretation, should permit
removal based on, say, an unjustified low number of decided cases
(as compared to other ALJs). 340 Whatever minimal supervisory
power the agency loses under the proposed removal standard as a
practical matter, the proposed standard mitigates impartiality
concerns that could arise under a broad reading of good cause,341
provides more specific grounds for removal, 342 treats ALJs like other
federal adjudicators (both those within and without Article III), and
makes clear that agencies may seek removal based on an ALJ’s
unjustified inability to control his or her docket (i.e., inefficiency). 343
The complete transfer of removal power from the executive to
the judicial branch may give one pause. After all, the Supreme Court
in Morrison was not only troubled by the Special Division’s limited
ability to terminate the independent counsel, but the Court also relied
upon the Attorney General’s limited ability to remove the
independent counsel when upholding the interbranch appointment of
the independent counsel. 344 And perhaps the executive branch’s need
338

See Barnett, supra note 117, at 1373–82 (arguing that “good faith”
standard is more open-ended than other removal standards and thus provides the
removing party more discretion to decide appropriate grounds for removal); see
also Timony, supra note 2, at 821 (referring to judicial interpretation of good cause
as “broad and expanding”).
339
See Barnett, supra note 117, at 1373–82.
340
See generally Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1989) (approving,
in an ambiguous opinion, controversial productivity initiative for ALJs within the
SSA). Professor Richard Pierce has opined that the productivity standard became
toothless based on MSPB decisions and reconsideration within the SSA. See
Richard Pierce, What Should We Do About Administrative Law Judge
Decisionmaking? 15–16 (George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law Research
Paper
No.
573,
2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1890770.
341
See Timony, supra note 2, at 822 (“Such broad and amorphous
standards may impinge on judicial independence . . . .”).
342
See id. at 824 (advocating use of clearer removal standard).
343
See id. at 826–28 (discussing removal based on low productivity).
344
See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 682–83 (1988); id. at 692 (“This
is not a case in which the power to remove an executive official has been
completely stripped from the President, thus providing no means for the President
to ensure the ‘faithful execution’ of the laws.”); id. at 695–96 (discussing the ways
in which the Attorney General could supervise the Independent Counsel, including
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for the removal power is at its apex when the executive branch does
not appoint the officer in question. Under the proposal here, the
executive branch’s removal power is fully removed, and the judiciary
has a more robust removal power than in Morrison.
But, in the ALJ context, the problems themselves provide the
solutions. As previously discussed, an interbranch-appointment-andremoval power cures the supervision and impartiality concerns in a
manner that executive-branch removal would flout. In other contexts,
the concerns that Congress sought to address did not require the
transfer of the removal power. For instance, the interbranch
appointment of the independent counsel mitigated an intrabranch
conflict of interest in having someone appointed to investigate the
executive branch itself, and the interbranch appointment of U.S.
Attorneys provides a last-ditch solution to ensure prosecutorial
continuity while the elected branches fight over a successor. But with
ALJs, the transfer of the removal power is part of the solution.
This problem-as-solution rationale would likely be
insufficient to justify the transfer of the removal power if it were not
also for ALJs’ unique role within the executive branch. As previously
mentioned, the underlying rationale of Free Enterprise Fund’s focus
on the removal power was that the President should not be required
to persuade executive officers. But ALJs exist to be persuaded. The
executive branch does not need the power to remove ALJs, as
opposed to other executive inferior officials who could make policy
decisions, to protect its political prerogative. In short, the removal
power is not always a necessary means of supervision. Moreover, the
President’s ability to overturn ALJ decisions and seek an ALJ’s
removal quickly permits him or her to have sufficient supervisory
power to ensure the central functioning of the executive branch.
Indeed, the lack of executive-branch removal power gives ALJs and
the administrative bureaucracy within the executive branch an
increased perception of impartiality and thus more public legitimacy.
The removal power’s “talismanic” quality 345 loses its mythical force
limited, “for cause” removal power). Moreover, the majority in Free Enterprise
Fund suggested that the President’s removal power was central to the President’s
supervisory power. See Krent, supra note 282, at 2426, 2437 (“But, to the majority,
the removal authority was talismanic . . . .”).
345
See Krent, supra note 282, at 2437; see also supra note 289 (referring
to scholarship arguing that courts should focus on other indicia of administrative
independence and executive control).
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in a purely adjudicatory context, where other methods of supervision
can and should suffice. The executive branch, in other words, may
completely lose the power to remove ALJs, but it still has significant
methods of supervising and directing them. 346
Finally, because the President should be deemed to have
sufficient supervisory power over ALJs, the D.C. Circuit’s power to
remove them should not transform ALJs into inferior Article III
officers. Under my proposal, the executive branch and the D.C.
Circuit, to be sure, share oversight of ALJs—the former through
supervision of policy and the latter through its limited removal
power. But ALJs, as between the executive and judicial branches, fit
better within the executive branch because they help formulate
executive policy through their initial decisions, and the executive
branch can control that policy by reversing those decisions. The
judiciary’s oversight is limited to removing ALJs for narrow causes
upon others’ requests, including that of the executive branch. Indeed,
as the Article III courts’ removal power over bankruptcy judges
suggests, 347 the judiciary’s power to remove an officer should not, by
itself, render that officer as one within Article III. In short, the D.C.
Circuit’s limited removal power as a form of ALJ oversight does not,
without more, render ALJs Article III officers, in light of ALJs’
function and greater oversight from the executive branch.
As the Court recognized in Mistretta when quoting James
Madison:
‘Separation of powers . . . ‘d[oes] not mean that these
[three] departments ought to have no partial agency
in, or no controul over the acts of each other,’ but
rather ‘that where the whole power of one department
is exercised by the same hands which possess the

346

To be sure, the Supreme Court may take a more formal view of
supervision by requiring, as the form of supervision, that the President have the
power to remove subordinates. If so, my proposal would likely impede the
President’s supervisory powers, and the quandary would remain unresolved. A
more functional understanding of supervision is likely necessary, and not
inconsistent with current precedent, to resolve the quandary surrounding ALJs.
347
See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2627 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2619 (holding that bankruptcy courts are not adjuncts of Article
III courts).
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whole power of another department, the fundamental
principles of a free constitution, are subverted.’ 348
Vesting the power to appoint and remove ALJs in an Article III court
falls far short of vesting the whole executive power in the judiciary
because the judiciary has no policymaking power whatsoever. The
executive branch has the ability to make policy at every turn and
continue “to take Care that the Laws are faithfully executed.”349
Here, as elsewhere, “constitutional principles of separated powers are
not violated . . . by mere anomaly or innovation.” 350
CONCLUSION
An interbranch appointment of ALJs is overdue. Five current
Supreme Court Justices (two of whom are eminent administrative
law scholars) have suggested that certain ALJs are not appointed
properly. Four Justices have suggested that ALJs’ tiered-tenure
protections may be invalidated in future litigation. And ALJ
impartiality is a continued topic of discomfort for scholars, litigants,
348

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380–81 (1989) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 325–26 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed., 1961) (emphasis in
original)). Indeed, even Justice Scalia may agree in the context of an interbranch
appointment. The lone dissenter in Mistretta (and Morrison), Justice Scalia chided
the majority for citing Madison for the point that the boundaries between the three
branches were porous. He argued instead that
[Madison’s] point was that the commingling specifically
provided for in the structure that he and his colleagues had
designed—the Presidential veto over legislation, the Senate’s
confirmation of executive and judicial officers, the Senate’s
ratification of treaties, the Congress’s power to impeach and
remove executive and judicial officers—did not violate a proper
understanding of separation of powers.
Id. at 426 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The text of the Appointments Clause permits such
“commingling” through interbranch appointments and thus may be acceptable even
to Justice Scalia.
349
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
350
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 385 (majority opinion). But see Va. Office for
Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1641 (2011) (stating that lack of
historical pedigree can indicate constitutional infirmity); accord Free Enter. Fund
v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3159 (2010); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,
905 (1997).
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and ALJs. Because of administrative uncertainty and distraction
arising from the mere presence of those issues, Congress should not
await judicial resolution of these troubling issues. Indeed, Congress
has remedied past separation-of-powers problems without waiting for
a definitive answer. 351 Moreover, even if ALJs are not
constitutionally infirm, they are not necessarily in excellent health.
An interbranch appointment, along with relatively minor statutory
changes to the ALJ appointment and removal scheme, can both
mitigate potential constitutional questions and ameliorate the current
concerns about ALJ impartiality.
Key constituencies, such as federal agencies, have good
reasons to support my proposal. For instance, despite losing the
ability to select ALJs under my proposal, agencies would gain a way
around the Rule of Three by obtaining the ability to nominate their
own candidates if they are unsatisfied with the three original
candidates. Because it is likely that the D.C. Circuit, in interests of
comity, will carefully consider the agencies’ views and proffered
candidates, the agencies may actually prefer to exchange the power
to select for the power to nominate. The agencies would also retain
the power to seek removal of ALJs. Under either the current or
proposed scheme, they must convince an independent body to
remove ALJs. And, to mollify their expressed concerns over the
protracted nature of ALJ-removal proceedings, agencies would
receive swifter resolution of ALJ-removal proceedings because of the
direct filing of an action with the D.C. Circuit. 352
351

After Professor John Duffy noted that the appointment of certain
administrative judges for the Board of Patent Appeals was very likely
unconstitutional, Congress altered those judges’ mode of appointment without
awaiting a judicial determination concerning those appointments. See John F.
Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 904, 904 n.*, 918 n.72 (2009) (citing 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2006) (as amended Aug.
2008)).
352
Given agencies’ reduced control over ALJs, as compared to other
agency employees, agencies have turned to rulemaking and non-ALJ hearing
officers when possible. See Wertkin, supra note 288, at 397–99, n.157 (citing
Jeffrey S. Lubbers, APA-Adjudication: Is the Quest for Uniformity Faltering?, 10
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 65, 70 (1996) (stating that non-ALJs are “sprouting faster than
tulips in Holland”)). Because agencies are in essentially the same, if not an
improved, position under my proposal as they are currently, an interbranch
appointment will likely not alter the agencies’ turning away from ALJs. The issue,
instead, concerns when Congress should require formal adjudication under the
APA.
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Likewise, ALJs should support an interbranch-appointment
solution. Despite failing to obtain Article III protections and status,
they do receive clarified tenure protection that is suited to their
adjudicative function, and they obtain more perceived and actual
indicia of independence. An independent branch’s appointment and
removal of ALJs should help balance the ALJs’ pro-agency bias that
is said to develop and help link the administrative adjudicators with
their deified judicial counterparts. No longer will a party to formal
agency proceedings be the appointing and removing power.
Even the D.C. Circuit judges have reason to support the
interbranch-appointment proposal. The D.C. Circuit has not been
fully staffed in more than a decade, in part because of the general
perception that the court is not sufficiently busy to require the
number of active judges that the court is permitted to have 353 and
because of the politicization of appointments to the “second most
important court” in the country, from which several recent Supreme
Court Justices have been elevated. 354 Vesting the appointment and
removal power in the D.C. Circuit may mitigate both concerns.
Proponents of having a full complement of D.C. Circuit judges could
point to the court’s increased duties to compensate for its low number
of decisions. And they could point to the court’s administrative role
in protecting formal executive adjudication—by selecting neutral
adjudicators 355—as a means of emphasizing the court’s important
and necessary place in the judiciary and the administrative state, and
de-emphasizing the court’s unofficial status as a junior-varsity
Supreme Court.
More broadly, my proposal demonstrates the potential for
interbranch appointments to solve structural concerns with the
modern administrative state. The clarified and simplified incongruity
analysis that I have proposed is consistent with interbranchappointment jurisprudence and perhaps may render interbranch
appointment a helpful tool for Congress to remedy as-of-yet
unidentified, future separation-of-powers conundrums. Congress,
353

See Bloch & Ginsburg, supra note 223, at 562 n.63 (discussing
Congress’s questioning of whether the D.C. Circuit was sufficiently busy to require
twelve judges).
354
Carl Tobias, The Urgent Need to Fill The Current D.C. Circuit
Vacancies, JUSTICA.COM (Nov. 14, 2011), http://verdict.justia.com/2011/11/14/theurgent-need-to-fill-the-current-d-c-circuit-vacancies.
355
See supra Part IV.C.2.
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thereby, can improve the fairness, both actual and perceived, in the
governing structures that it creates.
***
In closing, one final series of questions emerges: Should
scholars, including me, bother considering solutions for these mostly
formalist problems, largely arising from questionable Supreme Court
precedent? For instance, does it really matter, as a functional matter,
who appoints ALJs, when these ALJs may have lunch or chat around
the water cooler with other employees within the agency, or when the
agency can generally overrule all ALJ decisions anyway? Or, for
example, should we concern ourselves with a removal-power
doctrine that appears to invalidate tiered-tenure protection although
one tier of tenure protection can substantially limit the President’s
control over the administrative state? Similarly, should we worry
about independence and impartiality issues that are largely grounded
on appearances of impropriety and perhaps merely theoretical effects
of an agency’s appointment and initiation of removal? Indeed, should
we address the Court’s current formalist separation-of-powers
doctrines at all in light of its historical fluctuation between formalism
and functionalism?
In short, the answer to these questions—all of which, at
bottom, ask whether current doctrine that largely eschews
functionalism for formalism should matter to normative reforms—is
yes. Separation-of-powers scholars often seek to reshape or
reconsider separation of powers. 356 Although such work has its place,
the purpose of this Article is to move beyond the mere normative
issues and instead define the problems and answers within the
doctrinal construct that the Court has provided. Doctrine, for better or
worse, matters for practicing lawyers and judges, and I seek to
persuade scholars, practitioners, and Congress that my statutory
solution is a serious option to consider in resolving a multifaceted
problem.
Formalities can often matter both substantively and
practically. For instance, the Court has repeatedly held that the
vesting of the appointment power is not mere “etiquette or

356

See Barkow, supra note 289, at 16 n.2 (referring to the “vast literature”
on separation of powers and agency independence).
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protocol.” 357 Instead, the appointing formalities are express, specific
requirements in the Constitution meant to act as a bulwark for
democratic government. 358 But formalism, as with the Court’s
removal-powers jurisprudence can potentially have significant,
disruptive effects on the federal administrative state. 359 The proposed
solution here respects the substantive underpinnings, as well as limits
the disruptive effects, of the Court’s formalist doctrines.
Whether one supports or disfavors the Court’s formalism
normatively, one cannot simply ignore the doctrine or wish for its
demise. The Court has taken a decidedly formalist turn in its
separation-of-powers jurisprudence for nearly twenty-five years. For
instance, the Court has relied upon a more formal definition of
“inferior officer,” 360 settled upon a new two-part definition of
“department,” 361 eschewed a functional understanding of the
President’s removal powers that four dissenting Justices would have
adopted, 362 and likely returned to more formal limits on removing
disputes from Article III courts. 363 In light of these decisions and the
lack of functional counterexamples since 1988’s Morrison v. Olson,
the Court’s formal doctrines are not a mere fad, but instead a
conscious jurisprudential turn that scholars ignore at their peril.
These formal doctrines create, in part, the tripartite quandary that I
discuss here, and a solution becomes difficult because functional
concerns lose much of their salience. One must, therefore, confront
the doctrine on its own terms, seek a formal solution to a largely
formal problem, and—in the process—seek to suggest ways to soften
the edges or unintended consequences of the formalist doctrine with
permissible functional considerations. Here, I have proposed a formal
interbranch-appointment-and-removal mechanism that seeks to
address the formal problems of executive adjudication and account
for some functional avenues where the Court’s decisions permit.

357

See, e.g., Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 182 (1995) (quoting
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976) (per curiam)).
358
Id.
359
See generally Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3177–82
(2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the potential consequences of the Court’s
ruling on the double for-cause removal clause at issue).
360
See Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662–64 (1997).
361
See Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3163.
362
See id. at 3167–70 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
363
See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608–09, 2620 (2011).
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Finally, statutory proposals, such as the one that I have
proposed here that seeks to dull the edges of the Court’s formalism,
reduce the real possibility of the Court creating even more
uncertainty in the law to account for the problems that its formal
doctrines create. The Court’s separation-of-powers doctrines are
notoriously hard to reconcile, often lacking any theoretical
consistency. 364 The Court may be tempted to decide cases in ways
that avoid disruptive outcomes at the expense of whatever doctrinal
coherence exists. My statutory solution is meant to avoid such
decisions. Perhaps paradoxically, the Court’s formal, inconsistent
doctrines may have ultimately provided an impetus for solving both
formal and functional problems that have long plagued formal
administrative adjudication. And this solution may, as a consequence,
give ALJs some of the deification that they have long craved.

364

See Barnett, supra note 117, at 1350.

